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The Great Divide: The Political Implications of Southern Regional Identification in Kentucky

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Kentucky occupies a unique place on the American political landscape. The Commonwealth has never been fully embraced as Southern by most observers, but at the same time it is not necessarily a Northern state. As the intersection of North and South in the United States, Kentucky presents a unique opportunity to study the impact of regional identity on public opinion. Utilizing data from a 2014 survey of a random sample of Kentucky residents, we are able to demonstrate that Southern regional identification is fairly high in Kentucky, and that this identification has a significant influence on opinion regarding politicians and policy preferences in Kentucky.

Key Words: Kentucky, party identification, voting behavior

In many ways Kentucky represents the political crossroads of America. During the Civil War, Kentucky was considered a border state with divided loyalties between North and South. The divided nature of its politics continues today with observers rarely agreeing on whether the Commonwealth is a Southern or Midwestern state. The answer to this question is not very clear and depends heavily on the criteria used to define what a Southern state is. From a political and demographic standpoint, the state clearly has Southern sensibilities. Democratic candidates dominated Kentucky electoral politics during the early 20th Century; however, there always existed pockets of Republican strength with Republican candidates scoring notable victories in elections. These limited but consistent Republican victories lend credence to the argument that Kentucky is more Midwestern than Southern. In many cases, textbooks on Southern politics do not include Kentucky as part of the South (Bullock and Rozell 2013), yet the University of Kentucky, which is closer to Cincinnati than Nashville, has been a longtime athletic member of the Southeastern Conference. The unsettled nature of Kentucky's political culture makes it an interesting subject for the study of regional political identity.
Acknowledging that there is clear disagreement among political observers regarding whether Kentucky is Southern, perhaps a better question to ask is whether Kentuckians see themselves as Southern. Regardless of how the state is classified by others, Kentuckians perceptions of themselves as Southern, Midwestern, or something else could have major implications for understanding public opinion and public policy positions in the state. Using recent survey data, this study examines the following questions: First, do Kentuckians perceive themselves to be Southern? Second, if they do, does this identity vary by demographic or regional factors within the state. Finally, does Southern regional identification in Kentucky influence attitudes on the role of government as well as public opinion on specific policy issues? The results of the analysis reveals that most Kentuckians do perceive themselves to be Southern, that there are clear patterns that emerge with regard to who is more likely to see themselves as Southern and where these people are located, and that Southern regional identification has a tremendous impact on the political attitudes of Kentuckians.

**THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING**

The distinctive nature of the American South has long been recognized by scholars. At both the aggregate and individual levels, the American South has simply been different from the rest of the country. From a cultural standpoint, the region differs from the rest of the country in its preferences regarding religion, music, sports, and literature (Grantham 1994). From a public opinion standpoint, research demonstrates that Southerners differ from their non-Southern counterparts on a number of racial and moral issues (Key 1949; Rice, McLean and Larsen 2002; Valentino and Sears 2005). Most relevant for this examination, however, is the political behavior aspect of Southern distinctiveness, and how this distinctiveness influences policy preferences.

From a partisan standpoint, Democrats monopolized political power in the “Solid South” from after the Civil War to the late 1960s. This Democratic Party dominance in Southern states led to an emphasis on primary, rather than general, elections, disproportionate numbers of uncontested elections (Squire 2000) and a lack of interparty competition (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993). This translated to weaker Southern party organizations and an emphasis on individual politicians, particularly those with seemingly larger than life personalities (Gibson, et al. 1983). In the aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement two-party competition emerged in Southern states. The emergence of Republican success has resulted in many Southern politicians growing in prominence and influence nationally (Bullock 2009).

Institutionally, Southern legislatures also differ from legislative bodies in other regions. Party leadership is generally weak in Southern legislatures (Harmel and Hamim 1986; Hamm and Harmel 1993), and there has been little desire by legislators for increased legislative professionalism in the region (King 2000).
From a demographic standpoint, Southern states are less likely to have female legislators than other regions, and they are more likely to be composed of a disproportionate number of lawyers, realtors, and insurance agents (Squire 2000). These legislators also are more likely to exhibit higher levels of progressive ambition (Turner, Lasley, and Kash 2012). The distinct characteristics exhibited by Southern legislators suggest the existence of a common political identity that directly affects their approach to public policy problems.

At the individual level, the South exhibits distinctiveness in political behavior in a number of ways. Historically Southern voters have been less likely to turn out to vote, more likely to split their tickets, and generally have a different political decision making calculus than non-Southerners (Burden and Kimball 2002; Wattenberg 2002; Hillygus and Shields 2008). Ideologically, southerners are more conservative and stronger advocates of smaller government and localized control, than are voters from most other regions of the country (Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1985; Cowden 2001; Johnston 2001; Hillygus and Shields 2008; Squire 2000; Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993; Gibson, et al. 1983; King 2000; Häremel and Hamm 1986; Hamm and Häremel 1993). These individual level differences in political behavior and ideology from other areas of the country confirm the impact of Southern distinctiveness on political behavior.

Scholars have long wrestled with explaining where Southern political distinctiveness comes from. It has long been assumed that the values defining Southern political distinctiveness are rooted in history and political culture. Political culture has three components: what government should do, who participates in politics, and how government operates (Elazar 1966). Elazar identifies three political subcultures. The first, individualists, tend to use government for utilitarian reasons. This means that members of subcultures that fit this description are motivated primarily by self-interest. The second political subculture, moralists, believe that government should promote the common good. The third subculture is traditionalist. Traditionalists operate in a world where social connections and prestige matter. Elazar argues that traditionalist politics center on dominant personalities or families, who control the concerns of the political system with little input from outside groups. They define what issues are of importance and they confer prestige to leadership positions, social connections, and political behaviors that support their control of the status quo.

According to Elazar’s classification, the traditionalist subculture was predominant in the Southern states. Traditionalistic states tend to have more restrictive voter registration laws and lower voter turnout (King 1994). Traditionalistic states tend to have differently structured political institutions (Johnson 1976; Hero and Fitzpatrick 1988). Traditionalistic states also tend to have government programs that are smaller in scope and lower in cost (Johnson 1986) and tend to have less policy innovation (Morgan and Watson 1981). Other
scholars have explained parts of Southern distinctiveness with the concepts of race, gender, and income (Key 1949; Reed 1974; Rice and Coates 1995; Griffin 2006). Also a recent examination has argued that unique personality characteristics are a key component of Southern distinctiveness (Turner, Lasley, and Kash 2015). The preponderance of research supports the pursuit of Southern regional identity as an explanatory factor in the politics of the region. The impact of this regional identity in Kentucky serves as an excellent path for exploring its effect on politics because the state combines a mixture of political identities that can be compared against each other.

Although researchers may have trouble pinning down exactly what constitutes the concept of Southern distinctiveness, the important takeaway from this review is that scholars generally recognize the importance of Southern regional identification. The impact of this distinctiveness is what this study explores in greater detail below. Specifically, the research is interested in determining whether Southern regional identification influences political attitudes in Kentucky. First, the study investigates the extent to which Kentuckians consider themselves to be Southern. Second, it examines whether Southern identification varies by demographic and economic region. Finally, the investigation concludes with an examination of whether Southern identification in Kentucky influences opinion on both the role of government in people's lives and specific public policy issues.

DATA & METHODS

Data for the study were obtained from a survey of a random sample of Kentucky residents conducted by the Social Science Research Center at Western Kentucky University in the fall of 2014. This mixed-mode survey included 776 telephone and web completions. From a demographic standpoint, 75% of the respondents were white, and the median age of respondents was 38. Republicans, Democrats, and Independents were almost equally represented in the sample (36%, 34%, and 30%, respectively), and from an ideological perspective 40% of respondents identified as conservative, 30% identified as moderate, and 18% identified as liberal. The survey provided data on opinions regarding a number of specific public policy issues, information about the proper role of government, and regional identification.

The first set of dependent variables included in this analysis involves opinions on politicians and public policy issues. The issues included dichotomous measures of approval or disapproval of the President, as well as support or opposition to raising the minimum wage, Obamacare, Right to Work legislation, and gay marriage, with 0 signifying opposition and 1 signifying support in each instance. The additional policy questions examined opinions on what the focus of our immigration policy should be (coded 0 for halting the flow of immigrants or 1 for dealing with those already here illegally), and what we
should do with those currently here illegally (coded 0 for creating a pathway to
citizenship, 1 for a guest worker program, or 2 for deportation).

The second set of dependent variables included in this analysis examined
views on federalism. Three questions measured how much trust and confidence
respondent had in local, state, and the federal government, coded 0 for none at
all, 1 for not very much, 2 for a fair amount, and 3 for a great deal in each
instance. A fourth question asked whether government was doing things that
should be left to individuals and businesses (coded 0) or whether government
should be doing more to solve problems (coded 1). The final question gauged
level of agreement with the statement that the federal government should only
be doing things that cannot be done at the state or local level (ranging from 0
for strong agreement to 3 for strong disagreement).

There are ten independent variables used in our primary analysis. The
primary independent variable of interest, Southern, measures whether the
respondent indicated identifying as a Southerner. The next two independent
variables indicated whether the respondent identified as a Republican or a
Democrat. Dichotomous controls for gender, race, and whether the respondent
lived in a rural area were included in the model, as well as categorical controls
for education, age, religiosity, and income. In an examination of where Southern
identifiers in the Commonwealth resided, the study utilized dichotomous
controls for residence in one of the nine economic regions of Kentucky:
Bowling Green, Paducah-Purchase, Owensboro, Mountain, Lexington,
Cumberland, Louisville, Northern Kentucky, and Ashland.¹

RESULTS

The key initial question for this analysis is what percentage of
Kentuckians identifies as Southern. This is important because if only a trivial
number of Kentuckians identify as Southern then the influence this
identification has on politics in the Commonwealth would likely not warrant
further investigation.

¹ For more information on these regions see Paul Coomes’ “Improving Earnings per
Job: The New Economic Development Challenge in Kentucky” at
Table 1. Percentage of Regional Identification in Kentucky

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=776

As table 1 indicates, Southern regional identification in the state is anything but trivial. In our sample 62% of Kentuckians identify as Southern, as compared to 20% that identify as Midwestern, and 18% that identify as something else. Having established the existence of a significant number of Southern identifiers in the Commonwealth, the next step is to determine if any demographic patterns emerge regarding who is more likely to identify as Southern.

Table 2. Southern Identification in Kentucky by Demographic Characteristics

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.78 (.226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>.639 (.264)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>.910 (.274)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-.307 (.274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>1.354 (.218)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.121 (.073)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.042 (.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.111 (.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.140 (.068)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.240 (.214)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 701
Chi2 = 110.08
Prob>Chi2 = .00
Adj. R² = .164

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01

standard errors in parentheses

Table 2 illustrates clear patterns with regard to Southern regional identification. Because Southern regional identification is a dichotomous variable, a logit model was used for this investigation. The significant, positive coefficients for Whites, Republicans, those who consider themselves to be more
religious, those who reside in rural areas, and those who are lower on the income scale indicate that respondents in these groups were significantly more likely to identify as Southern. The variables controlling for Democrats, education, and gender failed to reach statistical significance, indicating no significant difference in Southern regional identification for these respondents. These findings support previous studies that have been done of Deep South states regarding the demographics of those who are most likely to identify as Southern (Griffin, Evenson, and Thompson 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Predicted Probabilities of Southern Identification in Kentucky by Demographics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Income</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although logit coefficients provide insight into the significance and direction of relationships, they cannot be directly interpreted. Therefore, predicted probabilities were calculated to further examine these patterns. White respondents have a .67 probability of identifying as Southern, as opposed to a .51 probability for non-Whites. Republicans have a .76 probability of identifying as Southern, while Independents and Democrats only have a .44 probability of identifying as Southern. Respondents exhibiting the highest level of religiosity have a .70 probability of identifying as Southern, while those who have low levels of religiosity only have a .54 probability of identifying as Southern. Lower income respondents have a .70 probability of identifying as Southern, as opposed to as .58 probability for those in the highest income category. The strongest predictor of Southern identification is residing in a rural area, as these respondents have a .79 probability of identifying as Southern, as opposed to a .48 probability for those who live in urban areas or the suburbs. The results of
these predicted probabilities indicate that Southern regional identity plays an important role in identifying Kentuckians by demographic, regional, economic, and religious dimensions. This supports the contention that Southern regional identity may play a coordinating role in organizing political beliefs.

The next question of interest is whether there are patterns regarding where respondents who identify as Southern live in the state. To determine this, a logit model was run that regressed Southern regional identification on the nine economic regions of Kentucky to determine which examined, if any, of these economic regions of the state Southern identifiers are most likely to reside in.

**Table 4. Southern Identification by Economic Region of Kentucky**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Region</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.178</td>
<td>.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lexington</td>
<td>.832</td>
<td>.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>1.430</td>
<td>.398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland</td>
<td>.828</td>
<td>.422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowling Green</td>
<td>1.153</td>
<td>.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paducah-Purchase</td>
<td>1.159</td>
<td>.407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owensboro</td>
<td>.955</td>
<td>.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisville</td>
<td>.326</td>
<td>.264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>.420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>.583</td>
<td>.509</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 773  
Chi2 = 31.61  
Prob>Chi2 = .00  
Adj. R²=.031  
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01  
*standard errors in parentheses

As Table 4 illustrates, Southern identifiers are significantly more likely to reside in the Bowling Green, Paducah-Purchase, Owensboro, Mountain, Lexington, or Cumberland regions of the state. No significant relationship with regard to Southern identification was found for the Louisville, Northern Kentucky, and Ashland regions of the state, which is not completely surprising given that these regions share borders with Midwestern states and their populations are more likely to include individuals from both areas. Again, predicted probabilities were calculated to gather further insight into the location of Southern regional identifiers, and these can be found in Table 5.
Table 5. Predicted Probabilities of Southern Identification in Kentucky by Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowling Green</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paducah-Purchase</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owensboro</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lexington</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=773

Mountain region residents were most likely to identify as Southern, with a predicted probability of .78. This is followed closely by respondents in the Bowling Green and Paducah-Purchase regions, both with a .73 probability of identifying as Southern. Respondents in the Owensboro region had a probability of identifying as Southern of .69 and, finally, respondents in the Lexington and Cumberland regions each had a .66 probability of identifying as Southern. Essentially, as one gets closer to the border Kentucky shares with Indiana and Ohio, the likelihood of the region having significant Southern identification diminishes significantly.

The next section explores the differences between Southern and non-Southern identifiers with regard to public policy preferences. In these logit and ordered logit models, public policy positions on gay marriage, right to work legislation, immigration policy, minimum wage, Obamacare, and presidential approval were regressed against a number of demographic characteristics, most notable Southern regional identification.

As Table 6 demonstrates, there are clear differences between Southern and non-Southern identifiers on each of the policy issues under examination. The coefficients in column one indicate that, perhaps least surprisingly, Southern identifiers (Southern, White, Republican, Rural, and Religiosity) are significantly less supportive of President Obama than non-Southern identifying Kentuckians. This lower approval level among Southern identifiers is consistent with President Obama’s approval in other traditional Deep South states. These opinions are likely connected to opposition to the President and opposition to Obamacare. Southern identifiers in Kentucky are significantly more likely to oppose the President’s signature piece of legislation, even though Kentucky is cited by many observers as an example of how the program is supposed to work. Southern identification is also far and away the strongest predictor of opposition to right to work legislation in Kentucky. There has traditionally been a strong anti-union sentiment in the South (Simon 1997), which as a region has led in passing Right
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Obama Approval</th>
<th>Obamacare</th>
<th>Right to Work</th>
<th>Minimum Wage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-.544**</td>
<td>.582**</td>
<td>6.997***</td>
<td>.391**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.240)</td>
<td>(.239)</td>
<td>(.706)</td>
<td>(.195)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-.378</td>
<td>.538*</td>
<td>-.451</td>
<td>.483**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.284)</td>
<td>(.286)</td>
<td>(.616)</td>
<td>(.237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-.818**</td>
<td>1.524***</td>
<td>3.272***</td>
<td>.979***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.328)</td>
<td>(.315)</td>
<td>(.641)</td>
<td>(.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>1.678***</td>
<td>-.924***</td>
<td>-.663</td>
<td>-.934***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.270)</td>
<td>(.252)</td>
<td>(.577)</td>
<td>(.218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.370**</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.085)</td>
<td>(.082)</td>
<td>(.162)</td>
<td>(.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.151**</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.413**</td>
<td>.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.081)</td>
<td>(.080)</td>
<td>(.169)</td>
<td>(.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>-.240***</td>
<td>-.182</td>
<td>-.019**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.077)</td>
<td>(.075)</td>
<td>(.153)</td>
<td>(.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.201</td>
<td>.260</td>
<td>.930</td>
<td>-.737***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.239)</td>
<td>(.228)</td>
<td>(.467)</td>
<td>(.176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-.999***</td>
<td>.244</td>
<td>-.580</td>
<td>-.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.249)</td>
<td>(.238)</td>
<td>(.509)</td>
<td>(.184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.146**</td>
<td>.187**</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>2.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.075)</td>
<td>(.074)</td>
<td>(.152)</td>
<td>(.059)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 751
LR Chi2 = 70.37
Prob>Chi2 = 0.000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0595

N = 749
LR Chi2 = 35.87
Prob>Chi2 = 0.000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0229

N = 768
LR Chi2 = 38.46
Prob>Chi2 = 0.000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0235

N = 764
LR Chi2 = 25.84
Prob>Chi2 = 0.0011
Pseudo R2 = 0.0210

*p<.10
**p<.05
***p<.01
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 6 (continued). Public Opinion by Respondent Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gay Marriage</th>
<th>Immigration Focus</th>
<th>Immigration Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern</strong></td>
<td>-1.337***</td>
<td>-1.065***</td>
<td>.356*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.230)</td>
<td>(.216)</td>
<td>(.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>White</strong></td>
<td>.327</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>-1.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.273)</td>
<td>(.259)</td>
<td>(.242)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republican</strong></td>
<td>-.729**</td>
<td>-1.051***</td>
<td>.645***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.292)</td>
<td>(.250)</td>
<td>(.228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrat</strong></td>
<td>1.066***</td>
<td>-.136</td>
<td>-.509*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.283)</td>
<td>(.241)</td>
<td>(.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.148**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.078)</td>
<td>(.071)</td>
<td>(.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td>.129*</td>
<td>-.065</td>
<td>-.120*</td>
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<td>(.075)</td>
<td>(.068)</td>
<td>(.064)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>-.050</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(.071)</td>
<td>(.064)</td>
<td>(.059)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>-.129</td>
<td>.409**</td>
<td>-.409**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.222)</td>
<td>(.200)</td>
<td>(.188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural</strong></td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.308</td>
<td>.347*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.233)</td>
<td>(.208)</td>
<td>(.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religiosity</strong></td>
<td>-.114</td>
<td>-.071</td>
<td>.123*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.071)</td>
<td>(.066)</td>
<td>(.063)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 761
LR Chi2 = 70.37
Prob>Chi2 = 0.000
Pseudo R2 = .0595

N = 769
LR Chi2 = 55.87
Prob>Chi2 = 0.000
Pseudo R2 = .0229

N = 755
LR Chi2 = 38.46
Prob>Chi2 = 0.000
Pseudo R2 = .0235

*p<.10
**p<.05
***p<.01
Standard errors in parentheses
to Work legislation, and this sentiment is likely also strong among Southern identifiers in the Commonwealth.

Southern regional identifiers in Kentucky are also far more likely to oppose gay marriage. This finding should also be consistent with expectations, given the importance of religion to a large portion of Southern identifiers, as well as the strength of religious based opposition to the unions. Finally, Southern regional identifiers have vastly different positions on immigration policy than their non-Southern counterparts in the Commonwealth. When asked what the focus of our national immigration policy should be, Southern identifiers were significantly more likely to indicate that our resources should be directed toward stemming the tide of those illegally crossing the border rather than focusing on dealing with those already in the country. With regard to what should be done with those already living here illegally, Southern identifiers were far more supportive of deportation, as opposed to non-Southerners, who were more likely to advocate the creation of a pathway to citizenship for these individuals.

Table 7. Predicted Probabilities for Public Opinion by Southern Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Non-Southern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obama Approval</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obamacare Opposition</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to Work Support</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min Wage Increase Support</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay Marriage Opposition</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration/Secure Border</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration/Deportation</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 7 illustrates, predicted probabilities were also calculated to further illustrate the differences between Southern and non-Southern identifiers in Kentucky on these issues. First, Southern identifiers only have a .25 probability of approving of President Obama, as opposed to a .37 probability of approval for non-Southerners. This probability of approval of the president is third lowest in the model, following only rural respondents (.19 probability) and Republicans (.20 probability). A similar pattern emerges with regard to Obamacare, as Southern identifiers have a .70 probability of opposing the law, as opposed to a .50 probability of opposition for non-Southern identifiers. This level of opposition is second only to the level of opposition expressed by Republicans (.83 probability).

Support for Right to Work in the Commonwealth appears to be largely driven by Southern identifiers, as this group has a .90 probability of supporting
this legislation. Non-Southern identifiers in the Commonwealth only exhibited a .12 probability of supporting right to work legislation. The next closest variable to Southern identification with regard to predicting support for Right to Work legislation is Republican identification, which has a .57 probability of supporting the legislation. Southern identification is also the strongest predictor of opposition to gay marriage of the variables under examination, with a .78 probability of opposing gay marriage. Non-Southern identifiers in the state only have a .48 probability of opposing these unions.

Kentuckians identifying as Southern are also significantly less likely to support an increase in the minimum wage. This group has a .39 probability of supporting this increase, as opposed to non-Southerners who only have a .70 probability of support. The only stronger predictor of opposition to a minimum wage increase is identifying as a Republican (.48 probability). Finally, with regard to what the focus of our immigration policy should be, Southern identifiers are significantly more likely to want government to work on halting the flow of immigrants at the border (.58 probability) rather than dealing with those that are already here (.42 probability). With respect to what to do with those illegal immigrants already here, Southern identifiers are far more likely to support deportation of illegal immigrants currently in the United States (.53 probability) than a guest worker program (.17 probability) or a pathway to citizenship (.30 probability).

Finally, the analysis examines differences in philosophies regarding the role of government between Southern and non-Southern identifiers in Kentucky. In these logit and ordered logit models, opinion of levels of trust and confidence in the federal, state, and local government, as well as opinion on whether government is too “activist”, were regressed against a number of demographic characteristics, most notable Southern regional identification.

As Table 8 illustrates, the general pattern that emerges is that Southern identifiers are more supportive of state and local power than their non-Southern counterparts in the Commonwealth. First, respondents were asked how much trust and confidence they have in the federal, state, and local government. With regard to the federal government, the positive, significant coefficient indicates that Southern identifiers were significantly less likely to indicate they had a great deal of trust and confidence. The opposite pattern emerges for state and local government, as Southern identifiers were more likely to indicate trust and confidence at these two levels of government as opposed to the federal government.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Trust/Con Federal</th>
<th>Trust/Con State</th>
<th>Trust/Con Local</th>
<th>Gov't Do Too Much</th>
<th>Federalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>.315</td>
<td>-.493**</td>
<td>-.469**</td>
<td>-.511**</td>
<td>-.475**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.196)</td>
<td>(.214)</td>
<td>(.201)</td>
<td>(.237)</td>
<td>(.198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>.724***</td>
<td>-.230</td>
<td>-.413*</td>
<td>-.913***</td>
<td>-.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.228)</td>
<td>(.240)</td>
<td>(.228)</td>
<td>(.294)</td>
<td>(.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-.044***</td>
<td>-.770***</td>
<td>-.633***</td>
<td>.989***</td>
<td>.661***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.224)</td>
<td>(.240)</td>
<td>(.224)</td>
<td>(.256)</td>
<td>(.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>.407*</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>-.158</td>
<td>-.805***</td>
<td>-.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.236)</td>
<td>(.253)</td>
<td>(.237)</td>
<td>(.282)</td>
<td>(.232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.144**</td>
<td>.187***</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>-.121*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.064)</td>
<td>(.069)</td>
<td>(.064)</td>
<td>(.081)</td>
<td>(.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-.106</td>
<td>-.195</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>-.424**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.187)</td>
<td>(.200)</td>
<td>(.180)</td>
<td>(.235)</td>
<td>(.194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.337*</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>.369**</td>
<td>.839***</td>
<td>.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.178)</td>
<td>(.191)</td>
<td>(.180)</td>
<td>(.222)</td>
<td>(.182)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.297***</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>-.239***</td>
<td>-.237***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td>(.064)</td>
<td>(.060)</td>
<td>(.073)</td>
<td>(.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>-.131**</td>
<td>-.080</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.056)</td>
<td>(.062)</td>
<td>(.057)</td>
<td>(.073)</td>
<td>(.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>-.115*</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.062)</td>
<td>(.067)</td>
<td>(.062)</td>
<td>(.076)</td>
<td>(.063)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 765
LR Chi2 = 14.42
Prob>Chi2 = .0715
Pseudo R2 = .0092

N = 744
LR Chi2 = 17.01
Prob>Chi2 = .0300
Pseudo R2 = .0119

N = 756
LR Chi2 = 29.89
Prob>Chi2 = .0002
Pseudo R2 = .0191

N = 741
LR Chi2 = 19.40
Prob>Chi2 = .0128
Pseudo R2 = .0125

N = 752
LR Chi2 = 58.61
Prob>Chi2 = 0.000
Pseudo R2 = .0329

*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01
Standard errors in parentheses
Next, respondents were asked if they thought government was doing too many things that should be left to individuals and businesses, or if government should be more involved in problem solving. Again, the coefficient indicates that Southern identifiers thought that the federal government was doing too many things that they should not be involved in. Also, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the federal government should only do things that cannot be managed at the state level. Southern identifiers were significantly more likely to want the government to do fewer things than their non-Southern counterparts.

Table 9. Predicted Probabilities for Federalism Issues by Southern Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Southern</th>
<th>Non-Southern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust/Confidence Federal</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust/Confidence State</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust/Confidence Local</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Doing Too Much</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Only Do What</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States Can't</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predicted probabilities for these relationships are illustrated in Table 9. First, Southern identifiers have a very low opinion of the federal government, as they demonstrate only a .04 probability of having a great deal of trust and confidence in that level of government. They exhibit significantly higher degree of trust and confidence in state (.16 probability) and local (.26 probability) governments. The level of trust and confidence in state and local government, rather than the federal government, exhibited by Southern identifiers in the state is similar to that of traditionally small-government advocating Republicans (.035, .12, and .22 probability, respectively). Southern identifiers also indicated that they thought the government was generally being too activist for their liking, as this group had a .68 probability of indicating that they thought government was doing too many things, as opposed to only a .55 probability for non-Southerners. In addition, Southerners in the Commonwealth were significantly more likely to agree with this statement that the government should only do things that cannot be done at the state level (.54 probability) than non-Southerners were (.42 probability). The analysis provides convincing evidence that Southern regional identity in Kentucky exists and provides a means for explaining the political behavior of its adherents.
CONCLUSION

Kentucky is often described as the intersection of North and South in the United States. Despite this, there has been a scarcity of research on what this unique positioning actually means as it relates to regional identification and politics. This research addresses this shortcoming by examining whether strong regional identities exist in the Commonwealth and, if so, what the implications of these identities are for politics in the state. The study finds that clear preferences of political identity do exist. Kentuckians largely view themselves as Southerners, and this regional identification has a significant influence on their opinions concerning public policy issues as well as philosophies on the role of government.

First, the analysis finds that a significant number of Kentuckians identify as Southern. Beyond sheer percentages, it reveals that respondents in six of the nine economic regions of Kentucky were significantly likely to identify as Southern, and that, consistent with prior research on the South in general, whites, Republicans, those in rural areas, the very religious, and those lower on the income scale were likely to identify as Southern. Secondly, the analysis illustrates that Southern regional identifiers in Kentucky were more likely to have ideologically conservative views on a variety of policy issues than their non-Southern counterparts in the state. Finally, the data reveal that Southern regional identifiers in Kentucky had significantly more conservative views on the role of government, favoring state action as opposed to federal, exhibiting more trust and confidence in government at the state and local level, and wanting a government that was generally doing as little as possible.

These findings are significant for a couple of reasons. First, they lend support to the idea of Southern distinctiveness. Even when controlling for a host of traditionally powerful explanatory variables like party identification, race, and gender, Southern regional identification still played a key role in Kentucky on views regarding government and politics. There was something about these identifiers that was just different, or distinct, from everyone else, and this had a tremendous influence on their political worldview. This is important, as it demonstrates that being “Southern” still matters.

Secondly, these findings contribute to the larger debate on what exactly constitutes a Southern state. Major textbooks in the field of Southern politics do not classify Kentucky (as well as West Virginia) as Southern states, commonly citing their lack of association with the confederacy as the reason why. However, with nearly 2/3 of its population identifying as Southern, sharing a border with several Southern states, and espousing political views that are commonly associated with the South, perhaps it may be time to take another look as the Southern credentials of the Commonwealth.
REFERENCES


The Phantom Segregationist: 
Kentucky’s 1996 Desegregation Amendment and the Limits of Direct Democracy

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Penny Miller
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Decades after Kentucky abolished de jure racial distinctions in education, the state legislature asked voters to strip segregationist language from their venerable constitution. Political elites were stunned when a third of the state’s voters, and majorities in five counties, rejected the change. However, the prime culprit for Kentucky’s 1996 constitutional amendment vote was not white racism, because African-American voters endorsed segregation at rates similar to whites. Rather, the Kentucky vote offers a particularly clear and particularly dramatic example of the limits of ballot-box policy making. It should alert scholars that highly publicized referenda in high-profile states — the focus of much direct-democracy research — may not be representative of how direct democracy usually operates.

Key Words: Kentucky, state referendum, direct democracy, segregation, constitutional amendment

Kentucky decided in 1996 to purge some embarrassing constitutional provisions left over from the days of racial segregation. More than 40 years after the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down “separate but equal” education, the state legislature finally asked voters whether they wanted to strip references

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1 D. Stephen Voss, a former President of the Kentucky Political Science Association, is Associate Chair and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kentucky. Penny Miller is a retired Professor and former Director of Undergraduate Studies from the same department. The authors would like to thank Paul Blanchard and the late Lee Sigelman and Malcolm Jewell for comments on an earlier draft. Mark Peffley, Gary King, Greg Hager, and Albert Dzur also offered advice along the way. Richard Fording assisted with an early stage of the analysis. The National Committee for an Effective Congress and the Kentucky Board of Elections provided excellent data. And we thank the journal’s editors, Michael Hail and Jonathan Pidluzny, for giving this research a home. All the flaws are ours.
to school segregation from their venerable constitution. "Are you in favor," a constitutional amendment asked, of removing "language requiring that separate schools for 'white' and 'colored' children be maintained?" The constitutional referendum also sought to revoke permission to impose poll taxes, a Jim Crow tool for disenfranchisement. A positive vote would remove the vestigial provisions.

Their proposal seemed destined to attract nearly unanimous support. The constitutional language had lost the force of law more than a generation ago, so no one gained from preserving it. No fringe groups mobilized to block the measure – hardly surprising, given that the state lacks a tradition of "massive resistance" to integration – and publicity leading up to the vote was minimal and entirely laudatory (Martin 1996; Lexington Herald-Leader 1996). African Americans widely endorsed the measure, and most evidence suggested that support for discrimination of the kind targeted by the referendum largely had died out among whites as well (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 94-97). Political elites thus were stunned when a third of those voting, and majorities in five counties, rejected the change.2

The actual impact of this pro-segregation surprise was minimal. Kentucky's constitutional amendments require only majority support, so the proposal won (Miller 1994, 90). Less clear were the vote’s implications. Taken at face value, the strong support for racist symbolism seems to reinforce concerns with trusting civil-rights issues to the voters (Gamble 1997). Such concerns might seem especially warranted in this context, given that Kentucky's electorate was moving to the right during the period – a development that eventually would propel a candidate skeptical of key Civil Rights Act provisions into the U.S. Senate (Voss 2010; Voss and Gross 2011, 154-156). But could Kentucky voters really have been that far behind the times? We doubt it. Kentucky’s 1996 vote intrigues us because the results were so unlikely, a warning of systemic failure.

Idealistic conceptions of "direct" democracy promise a form of policy decision making unmediated by elected or appointed elites (Butler and Ranney 1978b, 24-25; Hahn and Kamieniecki 1987, 16, 137). But no mechanism captures opinion without contamination, since someone obviously must frame public choices. We therefore exploit the presence of a voting bloc presumed to support the constitutional change – African-American voters – to assess how well ballot-box policy making captured voter preferences in this critical case.

Our results show that black voters endorsed segregation almost as often as their white peers did. We interpret this stunning result to mean that most of

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2 The exact vote was 563,864 to 274,438, a vote of 67.3% in favor. The amendment lost in Clinton, Jackson, Laurel, Martin and Monroe counties (Associated Press 1996).
the support for segregation appeared unintentionally. The problem in Kentucky was not the majority's lack of respect for minority rights, but the failure of elites to structure the choice clearly and the inability of the majority to communicate preferences through the ballot box. Even if readers do not accept our assumptions about the intentions of black voters and how they inform our understanding of white intentions, though — even if they persist in believing that most Kentucky voters knew what they were doing — the event offers a troubling warning about the dangers accompanying direct democracy.

**Popular Wisdom, Popular Prejudice: The Theory**

The Anglo-American political tradition features little role for the ballot box, beyond the occasional need to toss out untrustworthy officials (Bachrach 1967, chap. 3; Pateman 1970, 3-14). Voting was not designed to determine policy, for the masses were not thought capable or willing to engage in deliberation (Bachrach 1967, 31-32; Butler and Ranney 1978b, 34; Cronin 1989, chap. 1-2; Natchez 1985, 28-34). This republican vision has not fared well with the passage of time, however — a result stemming less from philosophical victories than from an erosion of barriers (Cronin 1989, 174-76; Natchez 1985, 156, plus chap. 1). Contemporary voters enjoy much greater policy input than they have historically (Hahn and Kamieniecki 1987, 137; Ranney 1978).

Less clear is whether the public capacity for self-rule has kept pace with opportunities. The American public knows next to nothing about who determines policy, nor do they reveal even the most rudimentary knowledge one would require to form well-reasoned preferences (c.f., Brodie 1995). Ignorance, however, is not the same thing as incapacity. A significant stream of research has buttressed public claims to greater participation (Cronin 1989, 87-89; Gerber 1996; Hahn and Kamieniecki 1987, 24; Price 1975, 248). Some survey researchers have worked assiduously to illustrate the rationality and sophistication underlying political behavior (Abramson et al. 1992; Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Lupia 1994; Page and Shapiro 1993; Stimson 1991).

Unfortunately, most surveys possess only limited potential for evaluating public capacity. They do not replicate the incentives and informational needs of a real plebiscite. Leaving aside any sampling and measurement concerns, or limits on how many people appear in any one geographical area, surveys are necessarily artificial. Few probe decision-making processes. Those gauging knowledge may hit respondents up for information long before a real decision is necessary (Cronin 1989, 71; Gelman and King 1993; Lee 1978, 111-112).

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3 This is not to imply that polls are deceptive, only that they also must make choices about sampling and question wording, and therefore are no more pristine than propositions. Voss, Gelman, and King (1995) discuss the geographical spread of polls, and Voss and Lublin (2001) show how attempting to get narrow geographical estimates out of national polls can go wrong.
One virtue of participation is supposed to be its educative role, but poll respondents have neither time nor incentive to prepare (Bachrach 1967, 99-103; Butler and Ranney 1978b, 33; Pateman 1970, 24-44). Experimental research, meanwhile, can simulate real opportunities for participation, but a laboratory environment finesse collective-action problems that sap regular motivation.

Judging among abstract arguments about public capacity, therefore, is hampered by the difficulty with subjecting them to definitive empirical test. Verification within genuine voting behavior would be a valuable contribution. Sadly, very few elections are so clear cut that we know whether the results represent voter intentions. A few studies, in which researchers measured intent retrospectively, provide the only tests of real-life voter capacity, and the findings are not positive (Hensler and Hensler 1979, 106; Magleby 1984, 144).

**Kentucky’s Desegregation Amendment: A Critical Case**

The paucity of evidence explains why Kentucky’s 1996 amendment is so valuable. The vote was over whether to remove vestigial provisions from the state constitution. These provisions, while not active law, offered nothing to African Americans. Even separationist or militant black voters are resistant to Old South symbolism. No voice in Kentucky – white or black, credible or otherwise – spoke against the referendum. Thus, it appears to provide a rare example when we can assume how one portion of the electorate would have voted with full information.

No surveys on the referendum exist to confirm this impression. To check the validity of our judgment, therefore, we interviewed a half dozen of Kentucky’s civic leaders, people who came as close as possible to being authorities on the state’s black community. These interviews, conducted by Penny Miller in the late 1990’s while memories were fresh, consistently returned the same response. All agreed that African-American sentiment uniformly favors removing the vestiges of Jim Crow from Kentucky law. Some were offended to learn that we’d encountered scholars during the review process who would be so out of touch that they’d suggest otherwise.

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4 Polling organizations sometimes call a telephone number more than once, but the purpose is never to give respondents time to think. Rather, these “callbacks” are restricted to residences where the selected respondent was initially unavailable (Brady and Orren 1992, 61-65; Voss, Gelman and King 1995, 108-110).

5 We have little reason to think that Kentucky blacks find segregationist symbolism any more appealing than those in Louisiana, who overwhelmingly rejected the statewide candidacies of former Klansman David Duke (Palmquist and Voss 1997, 14).

Assuming that blacks should have opposed segregation seems much less demanding, for example, than assuming that all informed consumers oppose insurance-industry preferences on complex initiatives (Lupia 1994, 69, 72).
Beverly Watts, Executive Director of the Kentucky Human Rights Commission, told us flatly, "I wouldn't be able to find any African American who would want to keep that language." Her statements were mirrored by Prof. Gerald Smith, a practicing minister who headed the University of Kentucky's program in African-American Studies. "Informed African Americans would have voted to remove the racist language," Smith said. Barbara Curry, Lexington's Commissioner of Social Services since 1978, said that it would be a mistake to confuse support for public agitators such as Louis Farrakhan with support for using the law to keep children of different races apart. "I do know of voters who are skeptical about whether integration is working." Curry explained, "but I've never met any black person who thinks black children should be forced out of white schools by the state," as mandated by the old constitutional language.

Porter "P.G." People directed the Lexington Urban League for a generation. He unreservedly rejected any notion that the constitutional referendum faced a clandestine groundswell of black opposition. "In all of my 30 years of leadership with the Urban League and in other civil rights leadership roles, I am convinced that the African-American community would not be desirous of keeping Jim Crow language in the Constitution," People said. "Any black voter who understood the amendment would have voted in support of it." Thus, we feel confident about the underlying preferences of a large voter base appearing in the data, and can use this knowledge to judge the success of Kentucky's referendum process.

The amendment possessed traits characteristic of ballot measures in many other states. Unlike plebiscites that have commonly received scholarly attention, for example, the Kentucky amendment operated in relative obscurity, with press coverage "thin and late" (c.f., Cronin 1989, 83). Only three members of the state senate opposed final passage of the measure, and no groups mobilized on the issue. Democratic State Sen. Tim Shaughnessy, the lead amendment sponsor, was unaware of any publicity campaign against it. The wording, composed by professional attorneys with the state's legislative services office, stands out for being legalistic and confusing - remove one word from the amendment and the meaning reverses - but semantic gymnastics in the voting booth are the rule rather than the exception with ballot propositions (c.f., Butler and Ranney 1978a, 17; Cronin 1989, 208-209; Hahn and Kamieniecki 1987, 22; Lee 1978, 113; Lupia 1994, 65; Magleby 1984, 118-120, 144). The 1998 South Carolina amendment to strip antimiscegenation language from the state constitution contained a similar twist in sentence logic, for example.

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6 For example, the measures studied by Lupia (1994, 64) addressed an immediately relevant matter of public policy. Interested parties spent more than $82 million to sway voters (1994, 65).
To the extent Kentucky's referendum deviated from typical experience, the differences would tend to improve voter performance. No media circus distorted the cognitive process a voter faced. Information costs for the measure were low. The 1996 Kentucky ballot contained no other amendments, initiatives or statutory referenda, so the burden was insufficient to induce "ballot fatigue" (Bowler, Donovan and Happ 1992). Nor did the amendment share the stage with any highly controversial items, so we have little reason to suspect that voters were particularly likely to ease the process by rejecting all measures summarily (c.f., Cronin 1989, 85). The policy at issue was neither technical nor exceptionally complex, as is often the case with ballot measures (Helburn and Barnum 1978; Hensler and Hensler 1979; Lupia 1994, 65; Scott and Nathan 1970). All voters needed to understand was that the amendment stripped empty segregation provisions from the state constitution, and that they should vote for it if they favored that goal.

Further, the Kentucky case gets around a common concern in the direct democracy literature. Bowlar and Donovan (1998) propose that uninformed voters rationally vote "No" on a provision when they are content with the policy status quo, avoiding unintended consequences of a measure they might not understand. However, we know of no knowledgeable scholar who would propose that blacks are mostly satisfied with the status quo in either American race relations or racial policy (see, e.g., Kinder and Sanders 1996, 17). Therefore, not even their theory, which is extremely generous to uninformed voters, would lead to a prediction that African Americans would have voted in favor of the pro-segregation position intentionally.

In sum, Kentucky's 1996 amendment provides a useful opportunity to assess plebiscites, a case in which we can assume the "right answers" for a group of voters a priori, yet one that is not distorted by complexity, manipulation, a crowded ballot, or high information costs. If the vote misrepresented public sentiment, then the breakdown must have occurred somewhere in the regular direct-legislation process found in Kentucky - from the implementation stage, when political elites framed public choices, to the flow of political information, to the balloting.

**PULLING THE HOOD OFF KENTUCKY'S SEGREGATIONISTS: THE ANALYSIS**

We know that Kentucky's high vote in favor of segregation stems from a combination of two sources: intentional support for racist symbolism, and voter error. The task we face is determining how heavily to weight each source. This is a difficult burden, because it requires us to estimate not only how people voted, but also how they intended to vote. The key to finding an answer is assuming (1) that all black votes for Jim Crow segregation were accidental, an assumption that (in light of the previous section) seems virtually
unassailable, and (2) that the pattern of error among blacks tells us something about how many whites voted in error as well.

Gary King’s (1997) solution to the ecological inference problem can estimate racial voting behavior accurately, so long as population figures and election returns are available at a low level of aggregation (Palmquist and Voss 1996; Voss 2004). Precinct-level returns were readily available, as were racial registration data for the year before. We tied the 1995 registration figures to the 1996 election results one county at a time. Occasionally, a county’s precincts lined up by name, with no changes apparent. More often, we had to collapse some precinct data to the level of towns or magisterial districts to ensure that the units were comparable. In a few of cases we had to give up and treat the county as a single unit. The result was 1,905 reliable observations.7

Losing information about white voting through this matching procedure is acceptable, because Kentucky’s black population is small enough to make estimating white behavior easy. Losing information on black preferences was more serious, since so much hinges on how well we estimate the behavior of that small population. Therefore, we confirmed the precinct history for heavily black areas through follow-up contact with county registrars. We are confident that almost every major concentration of black voters in the state was identified properly.

King’s method requires two steps: first estimating turnout, then estimating the choices among those who voted (Voss and Lublin 1998). We estimated statewide opposition to the amendment, broken down by race, using a simple version of King’s method. Our raw results were disturbing.

Estimated white support for segregation was 32.7% (standard error of 0.06). Estimated black support was 32.7% (standard error of 1.2) – exactly the same!8 Unless a substantial portion of Kentucky’s black population were secretly nostalgic for the Old South by 1996, an interpretation that the states black leadership dismissed as absurd, then these results strongly suggest that many people did not realize they were endorsing segregation and poll taxes.

We can confirm the extremely high level of support for segregation among African Americans by checking the vote within all-black precincts. As Table 1 reveals, these predominantly black precincts contained large numbers of phantom segregationists. Among precincts that were more than 95% black, the pro-segregation vote was just shy of that found statewide. The election returns were mathematically impossible without massive levels of pro-segregation voting by African Americans.

7 King’s method (1997, 149-51) is not distorted by using units of observation with highly varied populations. Quantities of interest are weighted by the number of voters in each areal unit.
8 The comparability of these two figures is in no sense required by King’s solution (1997, 92-94).
### Table 1. Incidental Black Support for Segregation

**Homogeneous Precinct Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTY</th>
<th>PRECINCT</th>
<th>Total Registration</th>
<th>% Democrat</th>
<th>% Registered Voters</th>
<th>Segregation Vote %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAYETTE A1109 OAKWOOD</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAYETTE A115 GREEN ACRES</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON N113 PRECINCT 113</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAYETTE A109 DOUGLAS WASH</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON M132 PRECINCT 132</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON N112 PRECINCT 112</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMPSON D103 HARRISTOWN</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON N111 PRECINCT 111</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON M101 PRECINCT 101</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON N125 PRECINCT 125</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRISTIAN A104 JOHNS ACT BDHG</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON M106 PRECINCT 106</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON M107 PRECINCT 107</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON M103 PRECINCT 103</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON N122 PRECINCT 122</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON C105 PRECINCT 105</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON M110 PRECINCT 110</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON N109 PRECINCT 109</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON M104 PRECINCT 104</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON N108 PRECINCT 108</td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON M129 PRECINCT 129</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON N119 PRECINCT 119</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON N118 PRECINCT 118</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON M102 PRECINCT 102</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON O103 PRECINCT 103</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON C110 PRECINCT 110</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEFFERSON N107 PRECINCT 107</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The "segregationist vote" in these homogeneous precincts is not an estimate, but the actual opposition to the 1996 amendment. The % Democratic in each precinct was computed using all registered voters, not just those committed to a major party. This list only includes predominantly black precincts whose approximate 1996 racial breakdown could be confirmed with the county. The average segregation vote, for precincts more than 95% black, was 34.4%; the weighted average with Simpson County removed is 32.5%, just shy of the overall statewide figure.

### King's Ecological Inference Solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Without Covariates</th>
<th>With Racial Density Covariate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Segregation Vote %</td>
<td>Std. Err.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This "segregation vote," broken down by race for the entire state, was estimated using Gary King's solution to the ecological inference problem. It relies on distributional assumptions about how voting varies from precinct to precinct, but does not directly assume how whites or blacks voted, either in general or relative to each other.
Adjusting for Aggregation Bias

These simple figures may seem to imply that no whites were racially motivated, given that naïve statewide estimates were identical for blacks and whites, but we shy away from that interpretation. Aggregation bias likely skewed these basic estimates. The logic is straightforward: ecological analysis gives special weight to African-American voters in all-black neighborhoods (King 1997, 85-90); voters in all-black neighborhoods are lower in socioeconomic status than blacks in more diverse precincts; voters with lower status err more frequently when voting for referenda (Cronin 1989, 66, 76-77). Thus the simple analysis would overestimate the number of black segregationists by using error rates from predominantly black precincts to help derive those for more diverse locales. An outlying all-black precinct, Harristown in Simpson County, strongly confirms this suspicion. Only 9% of voters in this mostly middle-class, well-educated black constituency opposed the amendment. Their low error rate may be more common in racially mixed precincts.

Fortunately, King’s technique allows us to model how segregationist voting shifted among blacks as the precinct’s racial composition changed (King 1997, 168-183). We did so, as portrayed in a previous incarnation of this research (Voss 2000, 238), and found that blacks were significantly less likely to endorse segregation if they lived in whiter locales. We estimate that perhaps 36.3% of African-American voters endorsed segregation in predominantly black precincts, but only about 31.8% did so where blacks formed half of the pool, and only 27.3% erred in almost all-white environments.9

This covariate analysis indirectly picked up a relationship between education and black errors, as we confirmed through linear regression (Voss 2000, 239).10 An educated populace clearly exhibits less voter error (p < .02 on the slope coefficient). An estimated 30.3% of blacks endorsed segregation in a county where only a quarter of black adults had a high-school education; the figure drops to about 27.2% if three-quarters of the black population reached that level. As indicated in Table 1, the statewide voting estimates, adjusted to reflect this aggregation bias, become 29.4% among blacks (standard error of 2.4) and 33% among whites (standard error of 0.1). These figures hardly offer

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9 Our covariate analysis used relatively conservative priors, but they resulted in reasonable estimates. For example, white voting in mixed-race precincts tended to be within a standard error of voting in a county’s other precincts. If we were overestimating the black segregation vote it is likely that variation across each county’s precincts would have been larger. Looser priors on the level of bias never dropped the proportion of black segregationists below a fifth of those voting.

10 The line is the result of a regression weighted by the black proportion of the voting-age population, so that counties with few blacks would not skew the slope. The regression’s stats: constant of .316, slope of -.00056 (t=-2.51), n=109 (because 11 counties have so few blacks no county education data are available on them), Root Mean Square Error of .04.
a reprieve for the referendum process. Our analysis still indicates that more than a quarter of black voters were phantom segregationists.

**Adjusting for Political Resources**

Determining how many whites accidentally endorsed segregation is a sketchier enterprise, with answers necessarily shaped by the assumptions one makes. Rather than presume everyone cast faulty votes at equal rates – which would mean that $33 - 29.4 = 3.6\%$ of whites favored segregation – we made the more-limited assumption that the white error rate varied with personal traits in roughly the same way as the black rate. This allowed us to adjust for a racial gap in socioeconomic resources. Specifically, we regressed the black vote for segregation on black per capita income, black high-school graduation rates, the level of urbanization, the portion of the labor force in professional occupations, and the proportion of families with more than one worker (details on the data appear in Voss 2000, chap. 10). The model fit the data decently, with a root mean square error of only 3.3 percentage points (see Table 2).
Table 2. County-Level Model of the Black Segregation Vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Expected Sign</th>
<th>Coefficient (t-stat)</th>
<th>p Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% high-school grads, blacks 25+ years old</td>
<td>(−)</td>
<td>−0.004 (−1.3)</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black per capita income (thou.)</td>
<td>(−)</td>
<td>−0.0028 (−1.1)</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% population urban</td>
<td>(−)</td>
<td>0.0002 (1.7)</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% professional of labor force</td>
<td>(−)</td>
<td>−0.0015 (−1.4)</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% families with 2+ workers</td>
<td>(−)</td>
<td>−0.0019 (−3.3)</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4426 (14.5)</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

observations 109
R² (adjusted) .223 (.184)
Root MSE .033

Note: The black vote for segregation, a proportion, was estimated using Gary King’s solution to the ecological inference problem. The regression was weighted by the black percentage of voting-age county residents, which resulted in more accurate within-sample predictions than other possible weighting schemes we tried. Coefficients are reported with four digits because of the dependent variable’s small scale; t-statistics appear in parentheses rather than standard errors for the same reason. Multicollinearity keeps standard errors relatively large in the model, but jointly the demographic variables allow a moderate fit with the data, as illustrated by the R² and root mean square error—which is what matters for forecasting purposes.

We estimated county-level error rates for whites by (1) substituting white data for the two racially specific explanatory variables, (2) computing predicted values from the coefficients, and finally (3) computing a statewide white error.
rate by summing county estimates according to the size of their population (Voss and Miller 2001, 73-74). Even after using this method to adjust for greater white socioeconomic resources, we find that only 6.4% of whites statewide intentionally voted to keep segregation in the Kentucky constitution. That figure represents our best guess.

Assuming the Worst
Of course, the 6.4% estimate still does not consider that some racist whites may have accidentally voted against segregation, so it could be too low. We expect that the error rates were mostly one-sided, for several reasons. First, voters usually oppose a proposition when they are in doubt about its meaning (Bowler and Donovan 1998). Second, the amendment contained the word “tax,” and that may have pushed confused voters to oppose it. Third, assuming that the error rate is equivalent in both directions would result in highly questionable county-level findings. For example, it would indicate that the five counties with a majority endorsing segregation actually intended to give much stronger support than they did. However, we can consider the effect of assuming that white racists erred at the same rate as tolerant whites, and that the data are tainted with phantom tolerance just as they are filled with phantom segregationism. Using the computation explained in Voss (2000, appendix 10A, reproduced here in appendix 1), our estimate of the percentage that wanted to support segregation would be \((0.33 - 0.266) / (1 - 0.2 * 0.266) = 13.7\). Even this unduly pessimistic approach would mean that only 13.7% of Kentucky’s white voters intended to support segregation, still fewer than did so accidentally.¹¹

CONCLUSION

News coverage of the Kentucky constitutional referendum attributed opposition to benighted racial attitudes in all-white rural counties.¹² The Associated Press (1996) quoted a hair dresser as saying, “Clinton County is a

¹¹ Only plausiblility stops the analyst from taking this to the extreme and assuming that all whites either voted for segregation or wanted to. Data cannot prove otherwise. Regardless of how high one pushes the racism estimate, though, no heroic assumptions redeem the referendum process.

¹² The received scholarly wisdom is just the opposite. Scholars (Giles and Buckner 1993; Giles and Hertz 1994; Glaser 1994) usually attribute racial conservatism to the presence of large minority populations, not their absence. This hypothesis has not enjoyed strong empirical support in contemporary data (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998; Lublin and Voss 1999; Voss 1996a; Voss and Lublin 2000), but all evidence indicates that the failure results from contrary urban attitudinal patterns (Voss 1996a). Both supporters and opponents of the “racial threat hypothesis” agree that it still applies to rural areas (Giles and Buckner 1996; Voss 1996b).
racist county, to be honest with you.” The county is almost entirely white and, she concluded, “I think they like it the way it is.” Rev. Louis Coleman, a vocal civil-rights activist, sounded a word of caution about reading too much into the returns, but added meaningfully that he has “had complaints from some of the five counties” opposing the amendment. Early the next year, reporters stressed the overlap between pro-segregation voting and the failure of counties to shut down for Martin Luther King Day (Mead 1997).

Our analysis indicates that the real lesson of this vote had little to do with Southern race relations, or with how voters think about civil-rights claims in public policy. Rather, the Kentucky experience reveals just how unreliable – and even dangerous – government by plebiscite can be, especially when publicity is low. A poorly worded amendment proposal was sufficient to result in a quarter of Kentucky’s voters accidentally endorsing racial segregation. Even if one is uncomfortable concluding that few whites intentionally embraced Jim Crow, because of the assumptions required to produce our estimate, there is the glaring fact that as many as a third of African Americans supported it. Voters did not educate themselves about what the ballot amendment meant, yet cast a vote on the issue anyway. How many more voters research their options when faced with more-complex choices? Our guess is, very few. Nor do we have much faith that informal social networks or low-information shortcuts somehow funnel behavior into “rational” outcomes. Rather, we suspect that systematic error goes undetected only because few plebiscites are as transparent as the peculiar case we have examined.

Obviously, Kentucky’s 1996 vote on segregation involved a single constitutional amendment in one particular state. Readers may be reluctant to draw firm conclusions from a single case, and we agree. No doubt the error rate also would have been somewhat lower, for example, in a state that mails information pamphlets directly to voters, detailing their choices. But social science is an incremental process, and this case is a valuable addition to the accumulating literature. It poses an unusually clear-cut example of widespread voter misunderstanding, fueling skepticism about the general capacity of voters to handle even low-cost voting decisions. And the Kentucky approach to referenda is not as atypical as one might wish. Similar results appeared in the 1998 South Carolina referendum on vestigial anti-miscegenation provisions, for example, in which ballot language also imposed a double negative (Voss and Miller 2001).

Of course, the spin we have placed in this discussion relies on our assumption that all black votes for segregation were unintentional. More than one reviewer of previous drafts has pointed to Louis Farrakhan, suggesting that he might have been indicative of a growing black desire for racial separation and that Kentucky’s vote may have expressed this rising militancy. Unfortunately, we have no ironclad proof to contradict such an Ivory Tower
view of black opinion. We rely instead on the wisdom and experience of those who worked within the state's black community as part of their daily lives.

Regardless, a more-pessimistic impression of black intent does not undermine our argument that the Kentucky case sounds a troublesome warning. To find in the election returns sweeping evidence of growing intolerance on both sides of the racial divide would only reinforce our central claim: that political scientists should keep a jaundiced eye turned toward America's "new democracy" (Fiorina, Peterson, and Voss 2005), with its direct democracy and public influence over policy, which has evolved heedless of the lessons of constitutional theory. The egalitarian march of history has awarded increasing weight to popular will, with the policy process warping to accommodate increased responsiveness, but there is little evidence that the American public is any more capable of bearing this responsibility than it was a couple of centuries ago.
APPENDIX 1

Using King's ecological inference method, allowing the black vote for segregation to vary with racial density (1997, 174-79), I estimated that 33% of Kentucky's white voters endorsed segregation. That figure includes two sets of people: those who support the symbolism of segregation, and those who made an honest mistake in the voting booth. We can portray the segregation vote as a weighted sum of those two components:

$$\beta_w = \gamma_{tw} \beta_e + \gamma_{rw} (1 - \beta_e)$$

where $\beta_w$ represents the observed white vote proportion for segregation, $\gamma_{rw}$ is the proportion of whites who intended to support Jim Crow symbolism (i.e., racist whites), $\gamma_{tw}$ = 1 - $\gamma_{rw}$ is the proportion of whites who intended to oppose segregation (i.e., tolerant whites), and $\beta_e$ represents the proportion of whites who voted the wrong way from what they intended. Note that this formula relies on the assumption that both groups err at the same rate, despite my suspicion that confused voters are far more likely to reject a referendum (one can adjust this basic equation to reflect any plausible assumption about how error rates compare across the two categories).

Because the proportion of tolerant whites is the complement of the proportion of racist whites, I can substitute for $\gamma_{tw}$ and solve the equation for $\gamma_{rw}$, the rate at which voters intended to promote segregation:

$$\beta_w = (1 - \gamma_{rw}) \beta_e + \gamma_{rw} (1 - \beta_e)$$
$$\beta_w = \beta_e - \gamma_{rw} \beta_e + \gamma_{rw} (1 - \gamma_{rw}) \beta_e$$
$$\beta_w - \beta_e = \gamma_{rw} - 2 \gamma_{rw} \beta_e$$
$$\beta_w - \beta_e = \gamma_{rw} (1 - 2 \beta_e)$$
$$\gamma_{rw} = \frac{\beta_w - \beta_e}{1 - 2 \beta_e}$$
REFERENCES


Holding School Leaders Accountable: Estimating the Effects of Retrospective Evaluations of Kentucky School District Superintendents

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This research represents an attempt to apply the theory of retrospective voting to the issue of turnover among Kentucky school district superintendents. The analysis tests the hypothesis that poor school district performance should increase superintendent performance. The hypothesis is tested using accountability data compiled by the Kentucky Department of Education. The analysis reveals somewhat mixed support for the hypothesis. Different performance measures have different kinds of impact. Schools with students scoring high on the math and writing were more likely to experience superintendent turnover than other school districts were. The index scores for science and social studies had a negative, statistically significant effect upon turnover. The district spending measure had a negative, statistically significant coefficient, indicating that the bigger spending districts had somewhat lower turnover than did other districts. Surprisingly, the superintendent salary measure is positively and significantly associated with turnover.

Key Words: Kentucky, education policy, superintendent evaluation

In politics and in many organizations, leaders appear to be evaluated based upon the performance of the programs that they lead. If their programs appear to be successful (e.g., if a coach's team wins ball games), leaders are retained and even rewarded. In the political science literature, an argument about the way that voters make decisions about candidates (particularly presidential candidates) has been based upon this tendency. The political science scholarship describes this phenomenon as “retrospective voting” (Fiorina, 1981). According to this argument, voters evaluate the incumbent based upon the performance of the government that he/she leads. In most of
the research, the incumbent who is examined is the incumbent president, and
the major focus of the voters' evaluation is the state of the economy. There is
considerable evidence that these retrospective models do explain quite a bit of
the variance in citizen evaluations of the president and the vote share obtained
by incumbent presidents and the presidential candidates of the incumbent's
party. Nonetheless, the near exclusive focus on the state of the economy
offers a somewhat incomplete view of the concerns of all voters, since most
voters care about a wide variety of other issues.

This problem in modeling citizen evaluations may be mitigated when the
analysis is directed to a different kind of public office responsible for a limited
set of policy responsibilities. Many governments, particularly at the local level,
are primarily tasked with carrying out a single kind of public policy. Public
school districts, for example, are responsible for delivering educational services.
They do not need to be concerned with foreign policy, environmental
regulation, or labor relations. They simply need to focus upon schooling. Of
course, education policy, like all policies, may have multiple dimensions.
Citizens and educators may have concerns about many different aspects of the
educational experience. It should also be noted that public schools are
involved to some extent in activities that are not education, in the narrowest
sense of the word. School lunch programs contribute to the nutritional needs
of children, school nurses promote public health, drug prevention classes may
serve law enforcement ends, and after-school programs may act as low cost
and convenient day care facilities. Nonetheless, one should think that schools
and school personnel would be evaluated by citizens using much less complex
criteria than would be applied to agencies and public officials involved in
general purpose government (see Berry and Howell, 2007).

The task of citizen evaluation of schools and school leaders has been
affected in recent years by the school accountability movement, which has
required public schools to be assessed based upon quantifiable scores on a
number of variables. These include student test scores, most obviously, but
also include measures of dropout rate, graduation rate, assaults on campus, etc.
Many schools or school districts also report to the public data on per pupil
expenditures, teacher-student ratios, percentage of classrooms connected to the
Internet, and other "input" measures. Access to these data makes it easier for
citizens and elected officials to evaluate the work of public schools. Quite
possibly, citizens will use such data to evaluate the leaders who run public
schools. If citizen-voters make evaluations retrospectively, they should
support elected school board members in districts that are doing well on the
accountability criteria and oppose those doing badly. For the same reason,
school board members should be expected to support (and vote to retain)
school district superintendents whose districts are scoring well on various
measures, while not retaining or outright firing superintendents whose districts
are struggling.
The paper proceeds in the following fashion. The first section of the paper will describe the superintendent’s position in Kentucky and some of the varied research addressing the causes of superintendent turnover nationwide. The second section describes an analysis of turnover in that position in Kentucky between 2000 and 2005. The third and final section discusses the results of that analysis and some future research directions that should be pursued.

**The Office of Superintendent**

Throughout most of America, public school districts are managed by a professional, appointed executive, who is hired (and sometimes fired) by an elected school board. With the exception of a very few elected positions, superintendents are viewed as non-political, presumably expert managers of school systems. They are accountable to school boards, which are almost always elected bodies, but they are also tasked with the implementation of education policy that is crafted at the state and somewhat at the federal levels. By most accounts, one of the most important duties of the school boards is the selection, evaluation, monitoring, and occasional termination of the superintendent (see Glass, 2000). Exactly how such decisions are made by boards regarding superintendents is not always clear. Certain legal constraints apply in most states. For example, in Kentucky superintendent candidates must be certified by the Education Professional Standards Board as superintendents before their appointment. Superintendents can be appointed for contractual terms no longer than four years. A superintendent can be removed for cause upon a vote of four-fifths of the school board membership with the approval of the commissioner of education (KRS 160.350). Also, superintendents can be dismissed upon the recommendation of a highly skilled certified educator and the approval of the commissioner of education (KRS 158.645).

Research on turnover among school district superintendents has largely relied upon descriptive rather than inferential statistical analysis. Some studies have indicated that superintendents in large districts have more turnover than those in smaller districts, but other studies find no impact. Some research has indicated that turnover among superintendents has increased in recent decades, but other research indicates that there has been no particular change (see Natkin, *et al.* 2002). Much of the research indicates that turnover is often related to personal attributes of the incumbent administrator, and is related to political factors or perceptions of poor performance in only a minority of cases (Alsbury, 2004). Some reports indicate that the evaluations by school boards of superintendents are not very probing, with favorable evaluations given even to superintendents of districts which by every measure are doing badly (Morford, 2012). The research does indicate that conflict with the school board and internal dissension within the school board is one of the reasons that
superintendents leave their positions. In some instances, superintendents who appear to be doing well will leave their positions to take new jobs in larger, presumably better financed school districts.

Research by Christopher Berry and William Howell (2005; 2007) has indicated that measures of student performance at the district level leads to an increased likelihood of re-election for incumbent school board members, at least in elections with relatively high turnout. In low turnout, presumably low salience and low information elections, there is no identifiable effect. Kogan, Lavertu, and Peskowitz (2016a) found that school performance information may affect school tax levy referenda outcomes, with voters less likely to approve levies when districts appear to be performing poorly. On the other hand, Kogan, Lavertu, and Peskowitz (2016b) also found that in Ohio districts, school report card information seemed to have no statistically significant impact on council turnover, vote shares received by sitting school board members, and superintendent turnover. The next section represents an attempt to determine if measurable school accountability is related to superintendent turnover in Kentucky districts.

ANALYSIS

To analyze the impact of student outcomes upon superintendent turnover, the Kentucky Department of Education school report card data set was downloaded. The school report card data set contains data on a number of different measures of student learning, as well as measures that relate to the learning environment or school district resources. The data set also contains the names of the school district superintendent for each district for each recent year. Data are missing for several variables and several districts over various years, so the analysis was limited to turnover between 2000 and 2005. The unit of analysis was the district by year. If the listed name of the superintendent for a particular district in one year was different from the name listed in the previous year, the district was determined to have experienced turnover in the office of superintendent and the observation was assigned a value of “1” for the turnover variable. Otherwise, the observation was assigned a value of “0”.

To estimate the likelihood of turnover, we built a model which included the average of all district Kentucky Core Content Test (KCCT) index scores in the following academic subjects: arts and humanities, mathematics, reading, science, social studies, and writing. Usually in each year three grade levels of KCCT scores were reported in a given subject. The mean values of each district for a given year were used. The data set includes measures for the number of assaults and drug incidents within the school district for a given year. We adjusted these scores by dividing the reported values by each districts’ enrollment. We also included a measure for the number of volunteer hours reported by the district, to control for levels of parental involvement.
This measure was also adjusted by dividing by the district's enrollment. To control for school district size, we included a variable representing the district's average daily attendance (ADA). A variable was also included to represent the district superintendent's salary, with the expectation that higher paid administrators may be less likely to leave. To control for the effect of school district finances, we included a measure of per pupil spending.

For the model reported in Tables 2, we included dichotomous measures for several performance indicators that represented whether a district ranked in the top third or the bottom third on a performance indicator. These variables are included to test whether school district performance may have a non-linear impact on turnover, with very high- and very low-performing districts having different impacts than average performing districts would. For the model reported in Table 3, we included a summary measure defined as the number of times that a district scored in the top third of the sample, minus the number of times that the district scored in the bottom third. This is included as a summary measure of overall academic performance. For the model reported in Table 4, we include an interaction term equal to the number of upper-third scores minus lower-third scores, multiplied by per pupil expenditures. This is included to examine the possibility that high spending might mitigate the effect of school performance on superintendent turnover. A dichotomous dummy variable representing whether or not the district was an independent school district, as opposed to a county district, was also included. This variable to some extent represents institutional differences, since independent district school boards are normally elected at-large while county school boards are elected from divisions within the districts. The county school districts also generally serve students in unincorporated areas, so the variable may also embody urban-rural differences. A logistical regression model was estimated using STATA. The results are reported below.

**FINDINGS**

The results reported in Table 1 indicate that some of the student outcome measures appear to increase turnover while others seem to decrease it. Ironically, schools with students scoring high on the KCCT math and writing exams were more likely to experience superintendent turnover than other school districts were. The index scores for science and social studies had a negative, statistically significant effect upon turnover. The district spending measure had a negative, statistically coefficient, indicating that the bigger spending districts had somewhat lower turnover than did other districts. Surprisingly, the superintendent salary measure is positively and significantly associated with turnover. The assaults incidents measure is also positively related to turnover, but only at a fairly generous level of statistical significance. The other variables did not have a statistically significant effect.
Table 1: Superintendent Turnover Explained by Subject Index Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Pupil Spending (thousands of dollars)</td>
<td>-.229** (.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Humanities Index</td>
<td>.039 (.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Math Index</td>
<td>.07** (.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading Index</td>
<td>.047 (.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science Index</td>
<td>-.095** (.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Studies Index</td>
<td>-.095** (.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing Index</td>
<td>.062** (.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent School District</td>
<td>.033 (.287)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Drug Incidents</td>
<td>-.014 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Assault Incidents</td>
<td>.026* (.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Hours</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Difference from State-Wide Average Enrollment</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Daily Attendance</td>
<td>-.06 (.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent Wages (thousands of dollars)</td>
<td>.02** (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.493 (10.685)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = p < .1  
** = P < .05

Examining results reported in Table 2 reveals some non-linear impacts that are worthy of note. Districts performing in the lower third of the sample in mathematics were less likely to experience turnover in their superintendent. Ironically, districts performing near the top in science and in social studies were also not likely to lose their superintendents. The number of assaults in the district seems to have a modest impact encouraging turnover, but the number of drug incidents has a modest impact discouraging it. The superintendent salary variable is still significantly and positively related to turnover, while school expenditures are still negatively associated with it.
Table 2: Superintendent Turnover Explained by District Ranking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Pupil Spending (thousands of dollars)</td>
<td>-.219** (.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Third Arts and Humanities Index</td>
<td>.313 (.356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom Third Arts and Humanities Index</td>
<td>.495 (.382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Third Math Index</td>
<td>.236 (.384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom Third Math Index</td>
<td>-1.01** (.349)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Third Reading Index</td>
<td>.376 (.321)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom Third Reading Index</td>
<td>.97 (.358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Third Science Index</td>
<td>-.687* (.356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom Third Science Index</td>
<td>.139 (.335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Third Social Studies Index</td>
<td>-.645* (.362)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom Third Social Studies Index</td>
<td>.391 (.359)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Third Writing Index</td>
<td>.449 (.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom Third Writing Index</td>
<td>-.832** (.309)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent School District</td>
<td>.116 (.272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Drug Incidents</td>
<td>-.019* (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Assault Incidents</td>
<td>.028* (.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Hours</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Difference from State-Wide Average</td>
<td>.000* (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Daily Attendance</td>
<td>-.078 (.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent Wages (thousands of dollars)</td>
<td>.021** (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.257 (10.694)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = p < .1  
** = P < .05
The results reported in Table 3 indicate that a summary measure of relative school performance is positively but modestly related to superintendent turnover. The per pupil spending measure continues to be negatively related to turnover, just as the assaults measure and the superintendent salary measures remain positively associated.

Table 3: Superintendent Turnover Explained by Number of Top Rankings in District minus Number of Bottom Rankings in the District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Pupil Spending (thousands of dollars)</td>
<td>(-.173^* (0.090))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Top Third Rankings Minus Number of Bottom Third Rankings</td>
<td>(0.04 (0.029))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent School District</td>
<td>(0.072 (0.272))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Drug Incidents</td>
<td>(-.017 (0.01))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Assault Incidents</td>
<td>(0.03^{**} (0.015))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Hours</td>
<td>(0.000 (0.000))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Difference from State-Wide Average Enrollment</td>
<td>(0.000^* (0.000))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Daily Attendance</td>
<td>(-.063 (0.105))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent Wages (thousands of dollars)</td>
<td>(0.021^{**} (0.009))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>(4.372 (10.075))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>(515)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^* = p < .1\)

\(^{**} = p < .05\)
Table 4 reports the effects of the interactive effect of spending and district performance. In this model, district academic performance (i.e., the number of top third rankings minus the number of bottom third rankings) is strongly and positively related to turnover, but the interaction between district spending and academic performance is negatively and significantly associated with related to turnover (because of the difficulties in interpreting interaction effects in logits, the ‘inteff’ command was used in STATA to graph the statistical significance of the interaction (see Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004 for a discussion), see Figure 1). This suggests that all things being equal, superintendents in high performing districts are likely to leave. But superintendents in high performing districts that spend a lot of money are actually likely to stay. Superintendent salary once again is associated with turnover.

Table 4: Superintendent Turnover Explained by Number of Top Rankings in District minus Number of Bottom Rankings in the District Interacted by District Spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Pupil Spending (thousands of dollars)</td>
<td>-.158* (.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Top Third Rankings Minus Number of Bottom Third Rankings</td>
<td>.349** (.139)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Pupil Spending Multiplied by the Number of Top Third Rankings-Number of Bottom Third Rankings</td>
<td>-.044** (see Figure 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent School District</td>
<td>.57 (.276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Drug Incidents</td>
<td>-.015 (.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Assault Incidents</td>
<td>.027* (.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Hours</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Difference from State-Wide Average Enrollment</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Daily Attendance</td>
<td>.03 (.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent Wages (thousands of dollars)</td>
<td>.021** (.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.748 (1.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = p < .1  
** = p < .05
Figure 1: Z-statistics of Interaction Effects after Logit

Table 5: Correlation of Academic Indices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Math</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Science</th>
<th>Social Science</th>
<th>Writing</th>
<th>Arts &amp; Humanities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Math</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading</td>
<td>.841</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>.879</td>
<td>.899</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Studies</td>
<td>.915</td>
<td>.857</td>
<td>.855</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing</td>
<td>.656</td>
<td>.654</td>
<td>.701</td>
<td>.665</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts &amp; Humanities</td>
<td>.889</td>
<td>.848</td>
<td>.844</td>
<td>.912</td>
<td>.691</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some of the puzzling findings may be due to multicollinearity. Table 5 reports a correlation matrix containing many of the index scores. Ironically, social studies index scores are highly correlated with math index scores at the district level, but these variables have diametrically opposed effects upon superintendent turnover. The social studies index scores are also highly correlated with the arts and humanities and the reading index scores, neither of which are related to turnover in a statistically significant way. Somewhat surprisingly, the correlation between the reading and writing index scores is not particularly strong.

**DISCUSSION**

These findings are quite interesting. Rather than finding that schools that were performing well on the accountability measures had lower turnover than other districts, we find that different performance measures had different kinds of impact. Whether this is due to the greater or different salience of some measures remains to be determined. It is possible that the math scores and to a lesser extent the reading scores, both of which are important for No Child Left Behind assessments, may be more important than some of the other scores. Perhaps superintendents with high math scores are lured away to other positions at other, higher paying districts. On the other hand, districts with high scoring students in science and social studies seemed to be retaining their superintendents.

Probably the most significant findings dealt with money. The effects of district expenditures were intertwined with district academic performance. Generally speaking, district expenditures per pupil discouraged turnover, as did overall district academic performance, but high expenditures and high academic performance particularly discouraged turnover. Another extremely robust finding was the impact that superintendent salaries had on turnover. Paying administrators fairly well does not keep them in the district. Perhaps high salary is an indicator of high quality, and the highest quality superintendents can be lured to other districts elsewhere, possibly out of state. In any case, these results do not offer much hope that Kentucky districts can retain their superintendents simply by paying them a bit more.

Further research on these questions is definitely needed, beginning with some examination of the effect that these index scores have on school board turnover. Change in the school board may also be related to change in superintendents. While superintendents are directly overseen by the school board members, it is the voters who would be making retrospective evaluations of the board members. Whether the voters assign responsibility to the school board based on the performance of the students remains to be seen. Also worth examining would be the impact of changes in the academic performance scores. These measures of "value-added" might be more useful for assessing
whether superintendents were being held accountable for the performance of their districts.
REFERENCES


A Case Study on American Social Media Privacy: Facebook and Government Oversight

Sarah Fink
Morehead State University

As we move further into the age of technology, there is no reason to expect the use of social media and the internet will decline. The government's inability to create a uniform technological landscape across offices and departments around the nation along with the shifting view of privacy in America has created openings for non-governmental companies, like Facebook, to collect the information freely given by citizens. This makes the privacy policies of social media companies civil rights and liberties issue for individual citizens as well as a national security concern. This paper argues that until the public, and policy makers, understand the threat of a new body controlling mass amounts of information on the American public, few concrete steps will be taken to protect users' privacy and the integrity of the country's data infrastructure.

Key Words: Facebook, social media, privacy, data security

Today, technology drives everything we do from how we keep up with our schedules to how the entire U.S. government functions. Information that used to be stored in complex filing systems can now be found with the click of a button. While this technological revolution has made many governmental functions quicker, it has opened the door for a new concern regarding citizen privacy. Personal information held by governmental offices was previously hard copy forms stored in locked cabinets, in secure rooms, in guarded offices. While the risk of information theft was still present, it was much more of a feat to break in and steal one hard copy than it is to download thousands of digital files. There remain legal and ethical obligations to protect the privacy rights of

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1 I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Michael Hail and the Intelligence Community Center of Academic Intelligence at Morehead State University, as without their support and guidance this research would not have been possible. I would also like to thank my parents, Bill and Kaye, and mentor, John, for encouraging me to ask the hard questions.
citizens for government even while there are increased risks. Modern day breaches can lead to the release of mass amounts of personal information ranging from credit card numbers, social security numbers, to home addresses and phone numbers. With the large amount of citizen data stored on government servers, all levels of government have become targets for amateurs looking to make money on the black market and larger, more organized, non-state actors.

Local, state, and the federal government have increased security measures and changed the way in which they work together to protect private information. However, with the inability to create effective policy in the ever-changing world of technology and the lack of technology in smaller rural areas, a divide has been created within the government. This divide does not relate to political views, gender, or other issues of the sort, but to the equipment and technological capabilities of those in government. The lack of a uniform understanding of technology across the states has led to smaller rural areas having less ability to survive in a government run by technology. Local and state governments with less equipment or understanding are at a disadvantage when competing with larger more urban areas. Due to this divide between the under-equipped and the over-advanced, the United States is now facing an information crisis like never before.

Aiding in the struggle of the government to keep up with technology is a public shift in attitude towards privacy. Younger generations are growing up with social media encouraging an open sharing of even the most intimate aspects of human life, while older generations are unaware of what sites to trust and who to give information to. In a Morning Consult/Politico poll from 2017 it is clear the public does not know who to trust when it comes to social media. The issue of privacy is still a bipartisan issue with 56% of registered Democrats and 60% of registered Republicans stating they did not believe the media giant Facebook would keep their data private, numbers sure to have risen since the Zuckerberg scandals in 2018. Those above the age of 18 are entering the years of applying to colleges, looking for employment, and creating a family leading to a more conscious view of what they post on social media. However, without regulation or a uniform understanding of how information is gathered by these social media sites it is easy to predict social

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media bypassing the government in an understanding of its citizens and their habits.

The government's inability to create a uniform technological landscape across offices and departments around the nation along with the shifting view of privacy in America has created openings for non-governmental companies, like Facebook, to collect the information freely given by citizens. These openings are secured by the lack of education in the public on what information Facebook collects, how the information is collected, and how the information is shared. Until the public, and policy makers, understand the threat of a new body controlling mass amounts of information on the American public there will be no steps taken to protect user's privacy.

THE FACEBOOK DATA POLICY

To fully understand what is at risk with the information gathered on social media sites, it is important to understand the complex world of privacy and data policies. These policies are designed to outline the usage of any information provided by a user. However, often these policies are complex legal documents confusing the average user. Facebook's Data Policy is no different. The site claims to simplify the privacy process by creating shortcuts, it steers users away from the actual data collected by the site and how this data is used.

Facebook's Data Policy currently contains options for the companies to collect information regarding a user's name, email, location, and habits. From information regarding how often a user checks the site or their notifications addictive tendencies can be deduced. Similarly, the information stored regarding the type of communications with other members and groups along with the duration and frequency of these discussions can lead to information regarding social habits. Facebook also collects data pertaining to how often others post, share, and tag a user determine who the user spends large amounts of time with. These factors along with the information gathered on the user's devices can lead to a large amount of identifying information being stored on a single individual and their network of friends. However, the Facebook site is not the only collector of data in the Facebook empire.

The Facebook Data Policy allows the company and its child companies to collect physical, geospatial, and intellectual content from its users. Users accept this policy when they create an account and join Facebook, however, few know what this policy really contains. The current Data Policy aims to outline the data usage and collection of the site and the controls users have over their information. Users can opt out of sharing information with certain
third-party partners, but cannot control what information is gathered and shared with Facebook and its child companies.4

The data collected by the Facebook Companies can be broken down as either identifying or non-identifying information. While these data policies do not specifically state what information is identifying or non-identifying the data can be broken down using the Department of Homeland Security’s definition of “identifying data.” DHS uses the definition, “any information that permits the identity of an individual to be directly or indirectly inferred, including any information that is linked or linkable to that individual” to separate identifying and non-identifying data.5 Using this definition the data gathered by Facebook and its nine child companies, Facebook Payment, Atlas, Instagram LLC, Onavo, Moves, Oculus, WhatsApp Inc, Masquerade, and Crowd Tangle.

Each of these companies collect different types of data based on their operations. Facebook Payments, Instagram, and WhatsApp Inc. are the most well-known of the Facebook companies, with Facebook Payments being the platform for financial transaction, Instagram being an image based social media platform, and WhatsApp being a messaging application. Facebook Payments is the most secure of the Facebook companies in terms of privacy sharing the bare minimum information required for processing and security.6 Instagram, much like Facebook gathers both identifying and non-identifying information on its users.7 WhatsApp collects identifying information pertaining to senders, receivers, and message time and date, but not the message content.8 The other Facebook companies are less well known. Atlas is an advertising platform which collects large amounts of demographic data on its users.9 Similarly, Crowd Tangle is an analytics program which gathers information on what demographics view user’s advertisements.10 Onavo helps in lessening the data usage on mobile devices and mainly collects information on the device it is

4 Data Policy. (29 September 2016). Retrieved from Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy
operating within.\textsuperscript{11} Outside of device related programs owned and operated by Facebook are the companies that collect more personal data such as Masquerade, Moves, and Oculus. Masquerade is a facial recognition software, the data gathered through facial recognition points is retained to suggest who to tag in photos and Moves is an activity and exercise tracking devices that gathers user’s identifying information from their body type, weight, and height.\textsuperscript{12,13} Lastly, Oculus designs and creates virtual reality scenarios through imaging of real world areas.\textsuperscript{14} The all of the information collected by these companies is permitted under the data and privacy policy to be shared within the Facebook family of companies. Table 1 outlines the types of data permitted to be shared outside of the Facebook family of companies.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
Company & Identifying Data Shared: & Non-Identifying Data Shared: \\
\hline
Facebook & Yes & Yes \\
Facebook Payments & No & Yes \\
Atlas & Yes & Yes \\
Instagram, L.L.C & Yes & Yes \\
Onavo & Yes & Yes \\
Moves & Yes & Yes \\
Oculus & Yes & Yes \\
WhatsApp, Inc & Yes & Yes \\
Masquerade & Yes & Yes \\
Crowd Tangle & Yes & Yes \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Data Permitted to be Shared outside of the Facebook Companies}
\end{table}

The Facebook companies are just one example of the massive amount of information that can be obtained, legally, on American citizens today. While unlikely, if a citizen was a member of Facebook and all nine of the Facebook

\textsuperscript{11} Privacy Policy. (20 December 2013). Retrieved from Onavo: 
http://www.onavo.com/privacy_policy/#informationcollection

\textsuperscript{12} Privacy Policy. (5 May 2014). Retrieved from Moves: http://moves-app.com/privacy

\textsuperscript{13} Privacy Policy. (28 June 2016). Retrieved from Masquerade by Facebook: 
https://www.facebook.com/msqrd/privacy

\textsuperscript{14} Legal Documents. (12 February 2016). Retrieved from Oculus: 
companies, that individual's privacy physically and intellectual would be at risk. Table 2 demonstrates an outline of how Facebook could pull together their data to form a copy of an individual right down to their habits and beliefs. This type of information collection is unrivaled by any non-government body in history, making the way in which America handles the challenge of protecting the privacy of Americans of the utmost important. While Americans are accepting these terms and conditions when creating an account there is no large label to tell an individual the potential risk, like there is on food and drugs. What is given to Facebook users is pages and pages of legal jargon claiming to aid in the user's security.

While the threat of social media may be seen as an issue only for younger generations to be more careful online, it also presents a threat to America's national security. With the gaps in local, state, and federal technological capabilities and equipment, the information held within governmental systems is still property of the United States Government. The information gathered by companies like Facebook are not tied to a nation, so without proper education and protection citizens could be handing their personal information over to an entity without the protection of the American Intelligence Community who is vulnerable to attacks or bribes by non-state actors.

**Figure 1. Intellectual, Physical and Geospatial Data Is Collected Automatically**
CONCLUSION

As we move further into the age of technology, there is no sign that the use of social media and the internet are declining. In this world revolving around clicks, likes, and shares personal information is readily available online. While these tools are valuable to our way of life and can be aids in improving the country, the public needs to be aware of the risk and the government needs to acknowledge the potential for damage. If the massive amount of identifying data stored in social media sites, like Facebook, were to fall into enemy hands the United States would face a crisis like none before. The enemies of the United States exploit these infrastructure weaknesses to collect intelligence while also utilizing the infrastructure to weaken our systems of intergovernmental self-governance. While the American Intelligence Community has used the sea of personal information online to protect the country through open-source intelligence, the risk of American’s personal information being used as a weapon or a cover identity is ever increasing. Americans need to be constantly aware of their online presence and demand action from the government to acknowledge and plan for social media as a potential threat to national security. Recent Congressional hearing on social media practices brought forth privacy concerns that mark the beginning of further investigation and expanded government oversight. The privacy policies of social media companies are a civil rights and liberties issue for individual citizens as well as a national security concern.

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REFERENCES


Consequences of Sexual Violence During Civil Conflicts for Post-Conflict Democratization

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Countries face large obstacles in the post-civil conflict period, including democratization. The nature of the warfare during the civil conflict may have important implications for the prospects for future democratization. Specifically, the experience of sexual violence during civil conflicts may hinder democratization. I argue that countries that experience prevalent sexual violence during civil conflicts have lower chances for post-conflict democratization than those without. This occurs through the psychological consequences of sexual violence on victims and communities. Sexual violence negatively impacts victims, but it can also have more widespread negative consequences for society. Communities of the victims may collectively respond to wartime sexual violence in ways that can generate increased hostilities, decrease the chances of enemies reaching the cooperation needed for democratization. In this paper, I examine these political consequences with cross-national data of sexual violence in conflicts, and find results that show that increased prevalence of wartime sexual violence is related to lower levels of post-conflict democratization success.

Key Words: Democratization, sexual violence, civil conflict

Do the consequences of sexual violence during civil conflicts have effects on the post-conflict period? Specifically, does wartime sexual violence affect the prospects for post-conflict democratization? During conflict, combatants will use a variety of weapons in order to achieve their goals, including traditional warfare, guerilla tactics, terrorist strategies, human rights abuses, and rape (Collier et al. 2003; Leiby 2009). The use of sexual violence in war has existed since antiquity and, although the international community defines its use as a war crime over twenty years ago, its use continues in many of the conflicts of the contemporary age, including many civil conflicts. The use of sexual violence in conflict has been shown to cause serious physical and psychological damage to the victims, but there has not been any systematic examination of the political impacts of sexual violence on post-conflict communities. Although psychology and sociology literature widely acknowledges that wartime sexual violence causes harm to victims, many questions remain about other consequences. What are the political
consequences of this type of violence for post-conflict societies? Can the physical and psychological effects of wartime sexual violence have negative implications for the ability of surviving communities to reconcile or gain political stability? This paper explicitly asks and seeks to explain: how is the process of democratization in post-civil conflict states affected by wartime sexual violence?

A growing body of literature examines the causes of sexual violence and how it is carried out in civil conflicts. Early work to explain the causes of wartime sexual violence focused mainly on ethnic or identity divisions (Bloom 1999; Plumper and Neumayer 2006). More recent works find that recruitment tactics and intra-troop discipline predict its use and relative degree in war (Cohen 2012, 2013a). Other work notes variations and patterns of intensity in scale, finding that rape occurs across all conflict types (Wood 2008, 2010; Leiby 2009; Cohen, et al. 2013). Although knowing the causes and trends of this practice is essential in developing our understanding of this type of violence during wartime, it is also important to understand the post-conflict impact. Aside from case study evidence, scholars have not examined the specific outcomes of wartime sexual violence, including its political consequences (Sharlach 2000; Liebling-Kalifani et al. 2011; Seifer 1996).

Unlike the recent work on sexual violence, there is a large literature that addresses the prospects for post-conflict democratization. Given significant heterogeneity in democratization trajectories for post-conflict states (Colaresi 2014), many scholars have attempted to understand the factors contributing to success and failure, most focusing on the civil conflict characteristics. Colaresi (2014) and Wantchekon and Neeman (2012) focus on the type of external intervening actors. Gurses and Mason (2008) focus on the nature of the outcome of the civil war, specifically finding that a decisive military victory on one side decreases the probability of post-war democratization. Although many scholars have attempted to identify important conflict characteristics that affect democratization, there is notable empirical ambiguity (Colaresi 2014: 66-67). World Bank reports (2008) and Fortna and Huang (2012) find that there is little empirical evidence to suggest that the traits of civil wars matter for post-conflict trajectories, concluding that post-civil war democratization follows the same patterns as other, more peaceful, contexts. Similarly, there has been inconsistent results concerning the role of ethnic heterogeneity (Fortna 2009) and the role of IOs, like the United Nations (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Pickering and Peceny 2006).

Although there is empirical ambiguity and theoretical disagreements about the factors that affect prospects for post-civil conflict democratization, I argue that one important factor is the prevalence of wartime sexual violence during the conflict. In this paper, I develop a framework to explain the political consequences of wartime sexual violence. Given that the topic of political consequences of sexual violence during conflicts has little existing systematic
work outside of small-N case studies, the framework presented here builds a unique and original foundation for future work for many political outcomes, linking individual victim experiences to the collective experience of communities. After examining the existing literature on post-conflict democratization, the expanding field of wartime sexual violence and its limitations, I offer my theoretical foundation. Beginning with statement of my assumptions, I explicitly lay out the logic of my explanation, and how such assumptions build to my propositions. My foundation explains how individual incidents of wartime sexual violence within a civil conflict context lead to community memories of trauma, which generate mistrust among those within a society. Thus, the skills necessary for conflict resolution, peaceful democratization, and institution-building are damaged. Next, I test the propositions of my theory using the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset recently developed by Cohen and Nordás 2014. I find results that support my hypotheses regarding sexual violence and post-conflict democratization, but results that call for further investigation into post-civil conflict democratization processes. Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings, and avenues for future research building from my presented framework.

**DEMOCRATIZATION AS A POST-CIVIL CONFLICT CHALLENGE**

There is a wealth of work that examines the consequences of civil conflicts. Due to the specific intensity of civil conflict violence, countries face large scale casualty counts, flight of refugees, and the devastation of social and economic infrastructure (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier et al. 2003). The intentional destruction of a country’s social and economic structures during a conflict has serious negative implications for regaining post-conflict stability (Collier 1999; Murdoch and Sandler 2004). The destruction of the economic infrastructure is threatened in the post conflict period when political actors are unable to credibly commit to peace settlements and new institutions (Flores and Noruddin 2009). Ghoborah, Huth and Russett (2003) also find that civil conflicts affect human suffering, even long after conflicts have ended. They demonstrate the long-lasting negative health impacts, including deaths and disabilities, generated by specific diseases and conditions, which disproportionately affect women and children. Post-civil conflict states may face additional challenges of meeting medical treatment needs, having impacts for public health and economic structures.

One important outcome for post-civil conflict states is its chances for democratization, addressed by a major body of work (Hippler 2008; Gurses and Mason 2008; Hartzel and Hoddie 2003; Doyle and Sambalis 2000). The challenges of democratization in post-conflict societies are great; as Roy Licklirdert aptly notes, it is difficult to bring 'groups of people who have been killing each other with considerable enthusiasm and success...together to form
a common government” (1995: 681). Much of the work in this vein considers the characteristics of the conflict and its termination. Gurses and Mason (2008) demonstrate that civil conflicts that end in negotiated settlements have higher chances for democratization than those that end in decisive military victories. They also show that previous experience with democracy and non-identity based conflicts have higher probabilities of democratization (Gurses and Mason 2008).

Other work considers the number and type of different actors involved. While some scholars criticize peacekeeping operations for over-simplification, standardization and an institutional focus (Labonte 2003), Doyle and Sambanis (2000) note that these operations improve the chances for durable peace and democracy. Pickering and Peceny (2006) focus on the role of international organizations and military forces, finding that liberal state involvement does not improve the chances of democratization, although United Nations involvement does. Other work from Colaresi (2014) finds that if previous interstate rivals are involved in conflicts, there are disincentives for post-conflict democratization. In a related vein, Wantchekon and Neeman (2012; 2002) find that external interventions increase the chances of post-civil conflict democratization when combined with a heterogeneous population.

SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN WARFARE: APPROACHES & LIMITATIONS

During conflict, civilians may not only suffer from traditional types of violence with damaging health effects (Ghobarah et al. 2003), but may also experience sexual violence. There are two approaches to understanding this violence, although both acknowledge the specific types of damage it causes. The first approach considers sexual violence as the result of intentional terrorism of civilians. Work using this more traditional approach appeared mostly after the atrocities committed in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, when the international community recognized systematic sexual violence as a punishable crime against humanity (Engle 2005). With this renewed attention, most of the subsequent scholarly studies sought to explain the causes and motivations of combatants. Sharlach (2000) argues that the aim of large scale sexual violence is the destruction of groups by damaging communities and weakening family morale, while others claim that group damage occurs through the normalization of violence against women (Freedman 2011). Leiby (2009) finds that governments and insurgents will use sexual violence in order to fit their strategic needs for deterrence and mobilization. Likewise, Seifer (1996) finds that wartime rape serves a specific and symbolic function in the destruction of society, which harms cultural and collective identities of entire groups. Here, explanations of rape suggest that the motivations of rape in wartime are to inflict permanent and destabilizing damage to communities, through violent physical and psychological trauma to victims and their group members.
The second approach, however, reflects newer research that diverges from previous explanations. With newly developed empirical data, Cohen et al. (2013) argue that sexual violence is neither 'inevitable' nor 'ubiquitous,' and occurs mainly as the result of poorly controlled troop units, not intentional terrorism or destruction of communities. Here, sexual violence reflects a lack of discipline rather than a methodological destruction of society. This approach suggests that sexual violence is not a pre-mediated act, but an unfortunate result of unstable war conditions. This growing literature also offers distinct explanations for the causes of sexual violence in civil war. Cohen (2013a; 2013b) notes that perpetrators are not only members of the armed forces of the state and rebel forces, but also include other civilians and peacekeeping forces, including women. Her findings indicate that gang rape results from attempts to foster intra-troop cohesion in situations where soldiers may have not voluntarily joined the armed forces.

The valuable and recent contributions of wartime sexual violence work seek to explain the causes of such violence. Concerning the consequences of such violence, the literature is largely silent. The existing work has been limited to the case-study qualitative approach. Liebling-Kalifani et al. (2011) conduct an extensive investigation into the physical and psychological consequences of sexual violence and torture on women during war by examining health conditions in post-civil conflict Liberia. Their study finds a wide range of negative health impacts resulting from the widespread killings, physical and psychological torture, sexual assault, forced prostitution and labor, and abductions that occurred during the conflict. These negative health consequences include urgent and unmet gynecological concerns, physical mutilation, infertility, increased prevalence of HIV, higher rates of psychological distress, higher rates of suicide attempts, links to drug and alcohol additions, the breakdown of familial structures, and significant cultural rejection of the victims (Liebling-Kalifani et al. 2011). The question unanswered, however, is: what is the political impact of wartime sexual violence on post-conflict societies? Specifically, can wartime sexual violence affect victims and their communities in a way that damages their willingness and skills necessary for conflict resolution, and ultimately peaceful democratization? In the next section, I argue that the answer is yes, laying out my assumptions and theoretical links.

**SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN WARFARE & CONSEQUENCES FOR DEMOCRATIZATION**

As outlined above, the characteristics of civil conflicts may have implications for the prospects of post-conflict democratization. Further, sexual violence during conflict has serious physical and psychological consequences for survivors. I argue, here, that these potentially disconnected concepts are related. In order to explain how sexual violence during civil conflicts
contributes to challenges of democratization in the post-conflict period, I develop an explicit theory, building from three main assumptions that lead to a major hypothesis tested in the empirical section.

Assumption 1: Negative Consequences of Wartime Sexual Violence for Victims

My first assumption is that wartime sexual violence is a distinct type of sexual violence that creates negative psychological and physical consequences for individual victims. Work from fields outside of political science consistently suggests that sexual violence in non-conflict conditions has long-term negative health consequences for the victims. Studies in psychology find that sexual violence generally creates persistent negative psychological effects for victims within a community (Xu et al. 2013). The persistent effects include psychiatric disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder and drug abuse. This literature also confirms that sexual violence health effects can remain persistent and long lasting, with the severity of outcomes depending upon victims’ different socio-psychological environments and abilities, including things like accessibility of treatment (Basile et al. 2007; Mullen et al. 1993; Atkeson et al. 1982; Burnam et al. 1988; Xu et al. 2013).

Unsurprisingly, the negative health consequences of sexual violence extend to and can be exacerbated by instances in conflict settings. As mentioned above, in Liebling-Kalifani et al.'s (2011) case study of post-conflict Liberia, they find evidence of negative physical consequences, including unmet and urgent gynecological concerns, increased sexually transmitted diseases, and mutilation. Liebling-Kalifani et al.'s (2011) case study also finds negative psychological outcomes, like increased suicide rates, addiction problems, and psychological distress.

Beyond this case study, however, there is still evidence that suggests the negative health outcomes of sexual violence during wartime should extend past conflict termination. Farr (2009) finds that injuries inflicted during conflict settings, like cutting, stabbing, or extreme sexual violence involving the use of foreign objects or multiple-perpetrator rape, can have long term implications, including lifelong disabilities. Other scholars note that the conflict situation itself exacerbates health emergencies if individuals have difficulty accessing adequate health services (Bruntland 2003; McInnes and Lee 2006; Ghorbarah et al. 2003). Without medical attention, the immediate injuries can lead to long-term physical disabilities and mental health problems, like PTSD, anxiety disorders, major depression and suicide (Murray et al. 2002; Hoddie and Smith 2009; Bruntland 2003; Xu et al. 2013; Ghorbarah et al. 2003).

Assumption 2: Negative Consequences Extend Beyond Individual Victims

My second assumption is that the negative physical and psychological health effects of sexual violence outlined above do not only affect individuals. Instead, these instances of violence have an impact on families and
communities, including communal memories of extreme events. Although the individual-specific damages inflicted upon sexual violence victims do not extend onto others, their suffering does affect those in their immediate surroundings, families, and communities.

There is work that suggests individual negative experiences can create more broad, community-level harm. In her work on conviction concentration and political participation, Burch (2013; 2014) finds that when neighborhoods have relatively high percentage rates of convictions and imprisonment, they tend to have lower levels of political participation. Here, Burch (2014, p. 186) explains that “concentration effects act as the central mechanism through which individual experiences with criminal justice shape the political activities and attitudes of entire communities.” Her findings confirm that individuals living in communities with high rates of imprisonment and community supervision by police have lower rates of voter turnout, civic and political activities, and volunteering (Burch 2014; 186). For Burch, the mechanisms through which individual experiences affect their neighbors has to do with the lack of ‘politically active role models,’ and the failure to transmit norms through observation of ‘engagement among their family members and peers’ (Burch 2014, 188; Tam-Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006, 156).

Similarly, police policies, such as ‘stop and frisk’ interactions, targeted at individuals can have community effects. Lerman and Weaver (2014) find that some communities experience concentrated policing where individuals witness high rates of police interactions. In instances where these interactions have excessive physical force and are perceived as unjustified, the “concentration and character of policing can have powerful influence on resulting attitudes about law enforcement” (Lerman and Weaver 2014; 205). The instances of ‘police disrespect’ are experienced as ‘community event[s]’ where individuals are publicly humiliated in front of onlookers who may be neighbors, friends, and family (Lerman and Weaver 2014; 205). Their findings suggest that concentrated policing not only affects feelings about the police, but feelings about government responsiveness, and in turn, behavioral outcomes like ‘active avoidance of government’ (p. 206; Weaver and Lerman 2010; Lerman and Weaver forthcoming).

The phenomena of individual experiences affecting community levels of political participation and trust of authority figures should not be limited to only negative experiences with the criminal justice system in the United States. Rather, I argue that high rates of sexual violence in wartime can function much as the negative interactions with law enforcement, convictions, searches and imprisonment. When wartime sexual violence affects a large enough proportion of a community, it is likely that neighbors, friends, peers and family may know individual victims and witness their personal struggles. When there is a high prevalence of victims, their traumatic experiences and struggles will be
witnessed and felt by family members, peers, and others in their social networks, sparking feelings of distrust and injustice.

Further, instances of wartime sexual violence can also be seen as ‘community events,’ that create persistent communal memories of trauma and injustice. For example, during the Japanese invasion of China during World War II and Rape of Nanjing, then Nanking, large numbers of civilians were murdered and, as the name suggests, raped. Although this event occurred more than seventy years ago, the communal memory still serves as an important source of Chinese patriotism and contention with Japan.¹ Today, the site of the rape of Nanjing holds countless politically symbolic spots, numerous mutilated skeletons, and a museum and monuments dedicated to the traumatic past. In media coverage about the event’s continued attention, Wagner (14 Dec 2007) reports that the ‘slaughter remains vital for the country’s cohesion’ and the ‘aftershocks of the attack can still be felt today in Chinese-Japanese relations’ through documentaries, television programs, and accounts of Japanese denial of the historical significance. Even though the wartime sexual violence perpetrated by the Japanese injured and scarred individual Chinese civilians, the events have real political consequences even seventy years later.

I argue that the experiences of individual victims do have community-level impacts. When there are high levels of sexual violence in a civil conflict setting, individual occurrences are unlikely to only be known to the victims themselves. Instead, spouses, children, other family members, loved ones, friends and neighbors witness their psychological and physical distress. When known enemy or government troops commit sexual assaults, members in the victims’ social network recognize injustice, violation of human dignities, and the insecurity of other family members and peers. In turn, communities can respond to the distress of a proportion of a population with feelings of emotional distress, insecurity and extreme distrust of known groups of perpetrators.

Assumption 3: Negative Consequences can have Political Implications

My third assumption is that the negative consequences of sexual violence in post-conflict communities may affect the subsequent political outcomes. As outlined above, negative physical and psychological health outcomes of sexual assault affect individual victims, but their suffering extends to include their families and communities. When wartime sexual violence is particularly pervasive, the conflict becomes a distinct type of conflict. It moves from being

one that faced challenges of damaged infrastructure and traumas of casualties, to one that must also deal with sexual violence surviving victims, their mental and physical health concerns, as well as community memory of the attacks. For these distinct types of conflicts, the trauma endured by affected communities is not easily forgotten. This community memory and experience of trauma can manifest in a political sense, namely, trust.

These collective memories and distrust resulting from prevalent sexual violence in civil conflicts impedes post-civil conflict democratization. Putnam (1993) argued that community trust was a necessary component of the social capital needed to foster strong democratic values. Trust is an even more important component in post-civil conflict situations. Once previously warring states have agreed to peace, states need to credibly commit to the establishment or re-establishment of democratic institutions. Previously fighting enemies may question one another’s commitment and trustworthiness, toward these goals in the wake of civil conflicts. I argue that the effects of high rates of wartime sexual violence exacerbate this challenge.

**Distrust of Government & Post-Conflict Democratization**

In the post-conflict period, leaders must be able to make credible commitments to post-conflict institutions (Fearon and Laitin 2001; Flores and Nooruddin 2009). Building from this logic, in order for democratization to take place, leaders must be able to make a credible commitment to establishing, or the re-establishment of, stable political institutions and the provision of security. When a large proportion of the population are victims of sexual violence perpetrated by government troops, new government leaders may not be able to credibly commit to renewed security. If communities share memories of traumatic wartime sexual violence, they may not trust the government to protect basic security, provide for their subsequent health consequences, let alone behave according to democratic standards. The lack of trust is confounded when government troops act as perpetrators for such violence. If government forces cannot be trusted to not commit atrocities against civilians, hold troops accountable for sexual violence, or meet security needs of community members, it will be difficult to maintain trust in its democratic governance.

**Distrust of Former Enemy Groups & Democratization**

The distrust between groups is also problematic for democratization. Post-civil conflict hostilities present large difficulties for democratization between opposing groups. Legacies of fighting and hostilities make it more difficult to come together in a cooperative and tolerant democratic regime (Licklider 1995). When one group acts as perpetrators of sexual violence against another intra-state group, the hostilities will be exacerbated. The communal memories of sexual violence during a civil conflict can lead to
intensified grievances, anger, resentment, and increased hostilities between groups. In these circumstances, cooperative democratic governance is unlikely. As such, I expect that civil conflicts that have prevalent sexual violence will have greater difficulties in post-conflict democratization. Thus, my propositions are as follows:

**Hypothesis 1**: Higher rates of wartime sexual violence should decrease overall democracy levels in the post-conflict period.

**Hypothesis 2**: Higher rates of wartime sexual violence should decrease the probability of democratization success.

**DATA AND METHODOLOGY**

In order to analyze the relationship between sexual violence during civil conflicts and subsequent democratization, my unit of analysis is each civil conflict. Although there are a number of options for data on post-civil conflicts that extend across a long temporal span, this study is concerned only with civil and internationalized civil conflicts on which there is a measure for the main explanatory variable of sexual violence, limiting the time span to 1989-2009. My dataset includes a total of 121 civil conflicts, with start date and termination date information taken from the 2010 UCDP Conflict Termination dataset. Due to the nature of tumultuous context in which wartime sexual violence occurs and cultural norms of shame, there is a lack of reliable resources for large-N, cross-national and cross-time data on such violence. However, the new Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset (SVAC) developed by Cohen and Nordás (2014) presents sexual violence data on all conflicts between 1989 and 2009. This new dataset enables scholars to examine sexual violence across contexts, and contains a wealth of information on the actors involved, types of sexual violence, and a number of variables, including the location, timing and targeting of victims, for intrastate, internationalized internal, and interstate conflicts as defined by Gleditsch et al (2002), and those defined by Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen (2008). The exact coding used in this study is explained below.

**Dependent Variable: Coding Democratization**

The major dependent variable in this study is the level of democratization achieved after the end of the civil conflict. In order to gauge this concept, I rely on two dependent measures to reflect post-conflict democratization levels using the Polity IV database developed by Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2014).
My first measure evaluates the *Polity* scores for years of interest in the post-conflict period: the first, third and fifth year after a conflict has ended.

My second dependent variable is *Democratization Success*, which is a dichotomous variable that represents whether a country crossed the threshold of a Polity score of 6 or above, measured at the intervals of the first, third or fifth year following the end of a conflict.

**Explanatory Variable: Coding Wartime Sexual Violence**

The main explanatory variable in this study is the prevalence of sexual violence in civil conflicts. In the SVAC dataset, three different sources are used to obtain information regarding reported levels of sexual abuse: US State Department, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch field reports. The SVAC builds upon the definition of sexual violence from the International Criminal Court and work done by Wood (2009) by including rape, sexual slavery, prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization or abortion, sexual mutilation and sexual torture for either gender (Cohen and Nordás 2014, 419). The unit of analysis for the SVAC is actor-state-year, where each actor is a side or rebel group in a given conflict. To gauge the prevalence of sexual violence in a conflict, they utilize an ordinal scale from 0 to 3 that 'captures the reported severity of sexual violence perpetration by an armed actor in a given year' (Cohen and Nordás 2014, 419). A score of 0 represents no reports mentioning abuses of sexual violence. A score of 1 represents 'isolated' sexual violence, where it is 'likely related to conflict' and a description of 1-25 victims in a given year for each actor was reported. A score of 2 represents 'numerous' reports, where sexual violence was described as "widespread", or 'common', 'commonplace', 'extensive', 'frequent', 'often', 'recurring', a 'pattern" for 25-999 victims (Cohen and Nordás 2014, 420). The highest score of 3 represents 'massive' sexual violence, wherein the violence is described as "systematic," and used as a tool for intimidation, control, or a tactic of war for at least 1000 victims.

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2 The SVAC dataset, which is explained fully in the next section, includes 27 conflicts that are ongoing at the end of the dataset. In order to maintain as many observations from a limited time frame, I decided to include these conflicts and their post-2009 Democratization Success and Polity information. In the analysis section, I also include an Ongoing Conflict control variable in one model, as well as perform separate estimations on both terminated and ongoing conflicts, finding similar significant results in all three. As such, the term 'post-conflict' in the analysis refers to post-conflict and post-SVAC conflicts.

3 It should be noted that as a result of 'interrupted' regimes, or those states that broke apart into separate countries, a few of the conflict observations drop out of the data, depending on the time frame. As such, subsequent multivariate analyses reflect a total number of observations as lower than 121 conflicts.
In this study, the unit of analysis is one given conflict. Since there is a discrepancy between my coding and the SVAC unit of analysis, the prevalence of sexual violence received significant recoding. First, there are different scores across the three sources. In many instances, one or two of the other sources reported no sexual violence in a given actor-conflict-year, or had missing data for the actor-conflict-year, while the US State Department included a level of 1 or more. For all of the instances where there were discrepancies across the sources, the highest level of reported sexual violence was used to calculate subsequent sexual violence measures. Second, I created two measures of sexual violence to reflect the unit of analysis of each conflict as one observation, collapsing the scores in the SVAC in two ways.

The first sexual violence measure is Total Sexual Violence, which reflects the sum of all sexual violence report scores for all years and across all actors of a conflict. The second measure is the Log of Total Sexual Violence, which reflects the log values of the Total Sexual Violence. Descriptive statistics for both variables are show below in Table 1. I chose to create a log version in order to rescale the original Total Sexual Violence measure, which has an extremely large variance. This also produced more normalized residuals from estimation models. As the original measure is an index of observer perceptions of sexual violence during a conflict, the log value is simply a rescaled index of the same values. Table 1 shows that Total Sexual Violence, or TSV, has a mean of 7.702, and a maximum score of 114 in one single conflict. This measure also has a large standard deviation of 16.046, showing a wide variance of scores across the conflicts in the sample. The Log of Total Sexual Violence, or LTSV, scores have a mean of 1.231, and a maximum of 4.745. The standard deviation of the LTSV is a much smaller 1.297, showing a much lower variance than that of the TSV for each conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Sexual Violence</th>
<th>Log of Total Sexual Violence</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>7.702</td>
<td>1.231</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>16.046</td>
<td>1.297</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>4.756</td>
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Confounding Factors: Control Variables

State Characteristics. The characteristics of the post-conflict state may have an influence on its chances for democratization. As such, I include two relevant factors. First, a country’s prior Experience with Democracy may influence its chances for subsequent democratization. If a country has previously experienced democracy, it may have existing skills, attitudes, and institutions available that would expedite the process of transition, deepening or consolidation. As such, I include a dichotomous variable that measures whether or not a country experienced democracy at any point in time prior to the conflict. In this study, a Polity IV score of 6 and above is coded as an experience with democracy.

Secondly, since economic development influences democratization, I control for a country’s economic level by including a log transformation of GDP per capita. Since there are three years of interest in this study, the GDP per capita reflects a one year lag of the log transformation of each year of interest. This means that for every post-conflict year of interest, there is a different lagged GDP per capita value.

Conflict Characteristics. The characteristics of the civil conflict may have important implications on the prospects for democratization. First, the intensity of the violence may have severe negative consequences on the level of public health. If a country experiences a large number of human causalities, the labor force may be significantly diminished. As such, I include the logged number of Battle Deaths from the civil conflict, which is also taken from the Colaresi (2014) data.4

Second, there is evidence that the number of factors involved in the civil war may influence the prospects for post-conflict democratization (Wantchekon 2002). To account for the influence of these factors, I include Actor Count that reflects the number of actors present in each conflict.

Third, I include a control for the length of the conflict since longer conflicts may have higher rates of sexual violence. As such, Duration reflects the number of years a conflict took place.

International Influences. There are a number of international actors that may have an impact on how democratization takes place in post-civil conflict settings. The role of United Nations interventions during civil conflicts may play a role in the prospects for democratization. Forta (2008) and Doyle and Sambanis (2000) argue that these interventions play a positive role in the post-

4 To test for the possibility of collinearity between a conflict’s intensity and its duration, I checked the correlation between Battle Deaths and Conflict Duration, finding that it is 0.418, showing a slight correlation. The exclusion of one or the other does not alter the significance of my main findings.
conflict setting, but there is little evidence on its exact implications for democratization. I control for UN interventions in my analysis with a dichotomous variable. Information on UN intervention was taken from a variety of places, including Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Fortna (2004), Kathman, Hultman and Shannon (2013) and Kathman (2013).

**ANALYSIS & RESULTS**

**Wartime Sexual Violence & Post-Conflict Democratization: Bivariate Relationship**

Initially, I consider the bivariate relationship between sexual prevalence during civil conflicts, and subsequent democratization. To do this, I first consider the Polity trends with varying levels of TSV. The results of this relationship are presented below in Figure 1. In order to examine the overall trend, I collapsed scores of TSV into three categories: Zero (conflicts with zero sexual violence); Low (conflicts with TSV scores between 1 and 3); and High (conflicts with TSV scores of four and above). Each of the bars in Figure I represents a different interval - one year, three years, and five years post-conflict. In all three post-conflict year intervals, those countries with Zero levels of TSV have higher mean Polity scores than those civil conflicts with Low or High levels of TSV. This effect is most pronounced in the first year following the end of a conflict, where the average Polity score for zero TSV conflicts is 4.4 points higher than those with high levels of TSV. This suggests an inverse relationship between post-civil conflict democracy levels and rates of wartime sexual violence. This pattern continues for all three periods of interest.

**Figure 1.**
### Table 2. Democratization Success across Levels of Sexual Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Sexual Violence Scores</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Year Post-Conflict</td>
<td>Zero</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>47.06%</td>
<td>27.78%</td>
<td>15.38%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>52.94%</td>
<td>72.22%</td>
<td>84.62%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Column Percentages</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson's Chi²</td>
<td>12.2467</td>
<td>P = 0.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      | 5 Years Post-Conflict       | Zero             | Low              | High             |
| Democracy            | 58.82%                      | 39.89%           | 28.85%           |
|                      | (30)                        | (7)              | (15)             |
| Autocracy            | 41.18%                      | 61.11%           | 71.15%           |
|                      | (21)                        | (11)             | (37)             |
| Total Column Percentages | 100.00%                    | 100.00%          | 100.00%          |
|                      | (51)                        | (18)             | (52)             |
| Pearson's Chi²       | 9.5856                      | P = 0.008        |

**The cell frequencies are reported below the percentages in parentheses.**

To further explore this bivariate relationship, I also considered how Total Sexual Violence may affect the prospects for successful democratization, where Polity IV scores of 6 or above are considered a success. Table 2 above presents the relationship between Total Sexual Violence and Democratization Success for the one and five year post-conflict intervals. Again, TSV is collapsed into levels of Zero (no sexual violence reported), Low (total sexual violence prevalence score of 1 to 3 in the SVAC dataset), and High (a score of 4 or above). Each cell reports the percentage and frequency of conflicts with different TSV levels that fall into the democracy or autocracy category. In both time periods, more conflicts with high levels of TSV fall into the autocratic category than achieve Democratization Success. During the first year following the end of a conflict, 47.06% of the conflicts that had Zero levels of sexual violence achieved Democratization Success, compared to only 15.38% of the conflicts with High levels of TSV. This pattern continues in the next time interval. Five years following conflict termination, 58.82% of conflicts with Zero TSV could be considered democracies, while only 28.85% of the High-TSV post-conflict states achieved the same level of success. In simple terms, in both time periods,
about half of the post-conflict states with no sexual violence will democratize, while the other half will continue to struggle. Those post-conflict states with high sexual violence, however, have much less success in democratization. Chi-squared tests show that the differences are significant in both time periods. This pattern also suggests an inverse relationship between post-conflict democracy levels and the prevalence of sexual violence during the civil conflict.

### Table 3. Bivariate Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Model 1</th>
<th>(2) Model 2</th>
<th>(3) Model 3</th>
<th>(4) Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity 1-Year Post-Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity 3 Years Post-Conflict</td>
<td>-1.621***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.487***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.405)</td>
<td>(0.421)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0907</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.0443***</td>
<td>0.0395***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0636)</td>
<td>(0.0662)</td>
<td>(0.0145)</td>
<td>(0.0146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.427***</td>
<td>3.079***</td>
<td>-0.358**</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.726)</td>
<td>(0.751)</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

I performed a simple bivariate regression as an additional analysis of relationship between Log of Total Sexual Violence and two dependent outcomes of Polity scores and Democratization Success. The results are presented below in Table IV with robust standard errors. Models 1 and 2 present the result of basic regression LTSV on Polity scores. In both the first and third year following the end of a conflict, there is a significant and negative effect on the
Polity measure of democracy, even while controlling for Conflict Duration since longer conflicts have inherently more opportunities to score higher rates of sexual violence. Models 3 and 4 present the probit estimation of LTSV on Democratization Success with robust standard errors. Probit estimation is appropriate since the outcome of interest is a dichotomous variable, where 1 represents crossing the Polity IV threshold score of 6 for democracy, and 0 represents autocracy. This analysis also shows that Log of Total Sexual Violence has a significant and negative impact on Democratization Success.

All four of the bivariate tests support my hypotheses that higher rates of sexual violence have a negative impact on post-civil conflict democratization. The patterns reported show an inverse relationship, where higher prevalence of wartime sexual violence is associated with lower levels of post-conflict democracy. Before concluding that sexual violence during civil conflicts inhibits the ability of communities to peacefully come together to build the institutions necessary for democratic success, however, I performed a series of multivariate analyses to control for other confounding factors. This analysis is presented in the next section.

Democratization & Wartime Sexual Violence: Multivariate Analysis

To fully understand the relationship of wartime sexual violence and post-civil conflict democratization, I performed a multivariate regression for LTSV on Polity scores. The results are presented below in Table IV with robust standard errors. Models 6 and 7 report the results of this estimation for 1 year and 3 years following conflict termination, respectively. In both of these models, LTSV has both a negative and significant effect on Polity, even while controlling for a state's previous Experience with Democracy, lagged GDP per capita, the Number of Actors present in a conflict, Conflict Duration, and conflict intensity in terms of Battle Deaths.

One complication in the SVAC’s dataset is that many of the conflicts included had not yet terminated in the timeframe of 1989 – 2009 (see endnote ii). To account for this complication, I created a dichotomous variable for Ongoing Conflicts. Model 8 reports the regression results of LTSV on Polity scores in the third year following conflict termination (or, the end of the SVAC dataset’s timeframe), while including the additional control for Ongoing Conflict. For Model 11, LTSV continues to have a significant and negative effect on Polity outcomes. Unsurprisingly, Experience with Democracy and Lagged GDP per capita have a strongly positive and significant effect on Polity, as does the dummy variable for Ongoing Conflict. The positive effect of Ongoing Conflicts on Polity scores is an unexpected result, which merits further investigation.
Table 4. Multivariate Regression for Post-Conflict Polity & Sexual Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Total Sexual Violence (log)</th>
<th>Conflict Duration</th>
<th>Experience with Democracy</th>
<th>Battle Deaths</th>
<th>Number of Actors</th>
<th>Lagged GDP per capita (log)</th>
<th>UN Intervention</th>
<th>Ongoing Conflict</th>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>R-squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>-1.013**</td>
<td>0.0334</td>
<td>1.691</td>
<td>4.22e-05</td>
<td>-0.137*</td>
<td>1.535***</td>
<td>-0.248</td>
<td>3.113***</td>
<td>-8.639***</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>0.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>-1.192**</td>
<td>0.0694</td>
<td>2.215**</td>
<td>2.94e-05</td>
<td>-0.0987</td>
<td>1.538***</td>
<td>-0.0113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>-1.292***</td>
<td>0.0469</td>
<td>2.369**</td>
<td>2.01e-05</td>
<td>-0.135*</td>
<td>1.472***</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>-0.583</td>
<td>0.00191</td>
<td>2.347**</td>
<td>2.01e-05</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.754***</td>
<td>-0.0884</td>
<td>1.913*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Robust standard errors in parentheses)*

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1*
Model 9 reports the results for multivariate regression of Log of Total Sexual Violence on Polity outcomes in the fifth year following the end of the conflict or five years after the end of the SVAC timeframe for all of the conflicts ongoing in 2009. In Model 9, LTSV does not have a significant effect on Polity. However, Experience with Democracy and Lagged GDP per capita continue to have strong positive and significant impacts on post-conflict Polity scores. The results of these models show support for my hypotheses that wartime sexual violence will result in increased challenges with democratization, although the results of Model 9 suggest that this effect may mollify over time.

To further examine the impact that sexual violence has on prospects for post-civil conflict democratization, I use a probit model to estimate the effect of Log of Total Sexual Violence on Democratization Success. The results of all of these models are presented below in Table V with robust standard errors. Models 10 and 11 report a negative and significant impact of Total Sexual Violence on the likelihood for Democratization Success in the three and five year intervals following the end of a conflict, while controlling for a number of conflict and state factors. Like the previous multivariate analysis, Experience with Democracy and Lagged GDP per capita both have positive and significant effects on the likelihood of Democratization Success. I also examine the influence of the Ongoing Conflict in the SVAC dataset. In Model 12, LTSV has a negative and significant effect, while Experience with Democracy and Lagged GDP per capita continue to be positively associated with Democratization Success. Model 12 also reports that the dummy variable of an Ongoing Conflict achieves a low level of significant for a positive effect on democratization outcomes. For Models 13 and 14, I ran separate models for ongoing conflicts and those that terminated within the SVAC timeframe. Again, LTSV remains negative and significant across both types of conflicts. Interestingly, for the 41 ongoing conflicts, the Lagged GDP per capita, Experience with Democracy, and Conflict Duration all have significant and positive impacts. This result, however, may be due to the low number of observations for this specific model. For those conflicts that have terminated, Experience with Democracy and Lagged GDP per capita have positive and significant effects on Democratization Success. Again, this result may be due to a limited number of results.
Table 5. Probit Estimation for Democratization Success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratization Success</th>
<th>(1) Model 10 3 Years Post-Conflict</th>
<th>(2) Model 11 5 Years Post-Conflict</th>
<th>(3) Model 12 3 Years Post-Conflict</th>
<th>(4) Model 13 Polity 3 Years Post-SV/AC [Ongoing conflicts]</th>
<th>(5) Model 14 Polity 3 Years Post-Conflict [Terminated Conflicts]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Sexual Violence (Lag)</td>
<td>-0.494*** (0.150)</td>
<td>-0.322** (0.132)</td>
<td>-0.511*** (0.160)</td>
<td>-1.008*** (0.260)</td>
<td>-0.327* (0.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
<td>0.0391** (0.0165)</td>
<td>0.0229 (0.0157)</td>
<td>0.0354** (0.0164)</td>
<td>0.0721** (0.0295)</td>
<td>0.0265 (0.0221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience with Democracy</td>
<td>1.124*** (0.338)</td>
<td>1.445*** (0.365)</td>
<td>1.178*** (0.350)</td>
<td>1.363** (0.686)</td>
<td>1.084** (0.443)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Deaths</td>
<td>-9.37e-06 (1.20e-05)</td>
<td>-2.24e-06 (1.50e-05)</td>
<td>-1.51e-05 (1.17e-05)</td>
<td>-2.05e-05 (1.81e-05)</td>
<td>-2.03e-05 (2.32e-05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Actors</td>
<td>0.0155 (0.0254)</td>
<td>0.00602 (0.0257)</td>
<td>0.0158 (0.0258)</td>
<td>0.0408 (0.0300)</td>
<td>-0.00936 (0.0543)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged GDP per capita (lag)</td>
<td>0.333*** (0.103)</td>
<td>0.371*** (0.106)</td>
<td>0.321*** (0.102)</td>
<td>0.434* (0.260)</td>
<td>0.308** (0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Intervention</td>
<td>-0.112 (0.117)</td>
<td>-0.192 (0.207)</td>
<td>-0.0616 (0.109)</td>
<td>0.362 (0.597)</td>
<td>-0.0744 (0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing Conflict</td>
<td>0.589* (0.321)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.192*** (0.808)</td>
<td>-3.664*** (0.818)</td>
<td>-3.299*** (0.863)</td>
<td>-3.564* (2.093)</td>
<td>-3.112*** (1.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To further illustrate the substantive effects of this probit estimation, I created predicted probabilities for Democratization Success for the levels of LTSV for each of the three years of interest, while holding all other control variables at their means. These substantive effects are shown in Figure 2a-c. The levels of LTSV are shown along the x-axis of each graph, while the probability of success ranges from 0 to .6 on the y-axis. In each of three year intervals, conflicts with zero sexual violence have close to a 50% chance of democratizing. However, as the rate of sexual violence goes up, this probability of democratization success decreases dramatically. This pattern holds for each of the three time intervals. The main difference across the three graphs is that as time progresses from 1 year after conflict termination to five years post-conflict, the confidence interval widens, although remains significant.

Figure 2a.
Figures 2b-c.
Both simple bivariate relationship and multivariate estimation analyses support my hypotheses that sexual violence during civil conflicts may have a negative impact on post-conflict democratization. Future empirical work examining the impact of sexual violence on democratization should extend past the time restrictions present in this analysis. Time extensions would contribute to these initial findings in two major ways. First, democratization is a long process, and the challenges faced by polities in the post-civil conflict period are multiple and complex. This limited time frame may not allow for investigation for such a long process. Many of the conflicts in this study, over 40 of the 121 civil conflicts, were either ongoing or recently terminated between 2005 and 2009. These conflicts have less than 10 years of post-conflict reconstruction or democratization time available for analysis. In addition, this limited time period does not leave open the potential for conflict recurrence. Future work should examine the impact of political instability and conflict recurrence in addition to the key components of democratization, like executive power constraints, institution building, and electoral competition. Democratization success depends on the ability of governments to establish credibility for trustworthy institutions. In the post-conflict period, these commitments may not fully be established within five years.

Second, this time frame obviously limits the number of conflicts available for examination. The structure of the data only allow for analysis of democratic and country factors for the geographic location of the civil conflicts. While some of these civil conflicts did not break apart into different autonomous states in the post-conflict period, many such as Yugoslavia, did. Future work should consider how sexual violence during conflicts impacts all of the post-conflict countries’ democratization processes.

**CONCLUSION**

Overall, the results support my hypothesis that high rates of sexual violence during civil conflicts can lead to lower rates of successful democratization efforts. The empirical analysis provides initial evidence for my theoretical foundation for understanding the political consequences of wartime sexual violence. In this case, the empirical analysis demonstrates an inverse relationship between conflicts with high rates of sexual violence and lower levels of democracy in the post-conflict period. While controlling for previous experience with democracy and a number of conflict characteristics, the results suggest that states that experience civil conflicts with high levels of sexual violence may face additional challenges. The challenges for democratization in these states may be the consequence of mistrust and resentment toward a government that failed to protect civilians. The challenges may also stem from hostilities between previous enemy groups, where group contains a large number of victims of sexual violence. Unsurprisingly, these groups may find it
extremely difficult to reconcile and cooperate with another that has committed war crimes on their mothers, daughters, wives, or other loved ones.

The results of this study are promising for future work utilizing the theoretical foundation for wartime sexual violence. Future research can build from my three basic assumptions. If wartime sexual violence harms individual victims, and individual experiences can have community-level effects, then research should explore potential other outcomes. If communities lose generalized trust toward the government and/or toward previous enemy groups, states may have difficulty in preventing conflict recurrence and maintaining political stability. Future work should consider these outcomes in addition to the key components of democratization, like executive power constraints, institution building, and electoral competition. Research should also consider how different conflict contexts may affect the post-conflict outcomes on communities. Further, more in-depth research should study the causal mechanisms at work between individual victims, family members, friends, peers and communities. It is the key assumption in my theoretical foundation, and research should look to explain more fully how whole communities experience such traumatic events.

The empirical findings here should be taken with the acknowledgement of the study’s limitations. First, this analysis is based upon a limited time frame between 1989 and 2009. This time restriction brings about a major pitfall. One, democratization is a long and challenging process. A twenty-year time frame may not allow for investigation into such a long process, especially for the most recent conflicts. Future work can improve upon our understanding of how sexual violence affects communities, and ultimately how to prevent such damage.
REFERENCES


Red Dog, Blue Dog, Yellow Dog: How Democrats Can Use Strategic Communications to Attract Republican and Conservative Voters

B. Gammon Fain
University of Kentucky

In recent election cycles, a rightward shift among white Southerners, and in some cases the loss of African-American supporters through racial redistricting, turned many long-held Democratic districts in the South red. Kentucky is an excellent example of this shift in voting behavior. Even though registered Democrats outnumber Republicans, the GOP controls the Governor's mansion, most other statewide elected offices, both chambers of the state legislature, and all but one of Kentucky's congressional seats. To win back those seats, Democrats in states like Kentucky will need to appeal to conservative voters. Unfortunately, little scholarly research directly addresses the practical question they need to answer: How can Democratic candidates attract right-leaning voters without sacrificing their credibility among voters on the left? On the basis of survey research conducted in Kentucky's 6th Congressional district during the 2018 midterm election, this paper argues that conservative voters respond positively to some crossover messaging from Democratic candidates, particular with respect to social issues.

Key words: Kentucky, voting behavior, political messaging

In the American South, you can classify what kind of Democrat someone is by the color of dog used to describe them. A Yellow Dog Democrat, for example, is so staunchly partisan that the Democratic Party could run a “yellow dog” for office and still count on the vote. Once common, before Republican presidential candidates started making headway in the region, Yellow Dogs

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1 This paper, which received the Abdul Rifai Award for best undergraduate paper at the 2018 KPSA, was sponsored by Dr. D. Stephen Voss.

2 I am thankful for the assistance, support, advice, guidance and friendship from my research mentor, Dr. Stephen Voss; for constant encouragement, laughter, and commiseration from my friends and classmates Erica, Elizabeth, and Abbey; and to my mom for always reminding me that there’s nothing you can’t teach yourself to do on the Internet. Lastly, I am thankful for the University of Kentucky, its College of Arts and Sciences, and the exceptional opportunity to receive an undergraduate education at this outstanding institution.
eventually were displaced by Blue Dog Democrats defined by their ideological moderation – if not their willingness to side with the GOP at the national level. So many Blue Dog Democrats populated Congress in the Nineties that they organized their own caucus. By the time they formed this pack, however, the Blue Dog Democrats already were endangered. A rightward shift among white Southerners, and in some cases the loss of African-American supporters through racial redistricting, turned formerly Democratic districts in the South into prime hunting ground for Republicans.

One such seat belonged to U.S. Rep. Ben Chandler, Democrat from Kentucky. Chandler comes from a long bloodline of Kentucky Democrats, including a grandfather who served as governor and senator. When he faced reelection in 2012, he epitomized the sort of Blue Dog Democrat being swept from Congress. Technically, the 6th District voters he served tended to be members of his own party, but outside of the main urban concentration in his district, many had shifted so decidedly toward the GOP in national politics that they can only be called Red Dog Democrats. Existing literature shows that unlike moderate Republicans, who have declined in recent years, the number of genuinely conservative Democrats has held steady, their ability to serve as swing voters sustained by new registrants in many locales. Chandler’s resistance to portions of President Barack Obama’s legislative agenda, most notably the Affordable Care Act, could not protect him from the discontent of right-leaning Democratic voters, who replaced him in 2012 with conservative attorney Garland “Andy” Barr.

Kentucky is a prime haven for Red Dog Democrats. Even though registered Democrats outnumber Republicans, the GOP controls the Governor’s mansion, most other statewide elected offices, both chambers of the state legislature, and all but one of Kentucky’s congressional seats. Dispirited Democratic leaders now find themselves hunting for a way to

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6 Ibid.
7 Commonwealth of Kentucky - State Board of Elections, "Voter Registration Statistics Report " (Frankfort, KY: Kentucky Secretary of State, 2017).
restore political competition in the state, which likely means winning back voters who have left their party — whether through their official voter registration or just through their voting records. Unfortunately, little scholarly research directly addresses the practical question they need to answer: How can Democratic candidates attract right-leaning voters without sacrificing their credibility among voters on the left? 

The 6th Congressional District of Kentucky remains the sort of place where Democrats would need to turn their fortunes around. A Democrat was elected in Kentucky’s 6th as recently as 2010, and it contains almost 100,000 more registered Democrats than Republicans. With an unpopular sitting president serving as figurehead for the GOP heading into the 2018 midterm election, the district has drawn three high-profile Democratic contenders ready to challenge Rep. Barr. This research paper takes advantage of the leverage provided by that real-life political contest to address the practical question of how a minority party can attract voters who normally do not support them. It does so through the use of a survey experiment in which a student sample viewed video advertisements intended to appeal to right-leaning constituents, with the ads randomly assigned so as to vary issue domain and messaging. Results underscore the almost-intractable difficulty that candidates face when trying, in terms of their message, to appeal to the center: More often than not, any inroads they make with unlikely supporters are counterbalanced by discontent among their likely base.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY

“When I was 12 years old, I knew exactly what I wanted to do when I grew up — I wanted to fly fighter jets and land on aircraft carriers,” says Amy McGrath in a highly circulated YouTube video announcing her candidacy. Neither the words nor the imagery makes her sound like a Democrat: She’s seen standing on a runway in front of a fighter jet, wearing a leather bomber jacket. At one point, while she’s speaking, B-roll footage of swooping military jets booms in the background. Her quirky ad excited Democrats nationwide, judging from the campaign contributions that flowed in afterward, because it seemed an approach that might fly in a district that Cook Political Report’s Partisan Voter Index (PVI) scores as R+9 (which is to say, the likelihood of electing a Republican is 9 points higher than the national average).

Existing research gives some hope that messaging might be able to help her, or another Democratic nominee, peel away normally Republican

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8 Ibid.

9 Amy McGrath for Congress, “‘Told Me” — Amy Mcgrath for Congress Announcement Video (Ky-6),” (YouTube.com2017).

voters. Political advertising can be effective in changing voters' attitudes towards candidates, at least in some form.\(^{11}\) Kahn and Geer studied a Pennsylvania gubernatorial race, experimenting with different types of advertisements to see how negative ads, positive ads, trait-centered ads, and issue-centered ads affected voter attitudes differently.\(^ {12}\) They found that while the choice between trait-centered and issue-centered ads made no difference, positive ads generally were much more effective than negative ones.

Different types of messaging will have different effects on voter feelings, but what really matters is how their attitudes inform the choices voters make in the ballot box. Many political scientists are skeptical about whether campaign strategies such as messaging are effective, noting the rise of (increasingly polarized) partisanship.\(^ {13}\) These real-world observations do not necessarily discount the value of pursuing crossover voters, however, because campaign advertising typically does not try to attract them; candidates these days advertise to their own base.\(^ {14}\)

Crossover ads might help Democrats in particular. Robideauxs studied, like Kahn and Geer, how voters responded to advertisements, varying their level of negativity/positivity. However, the research distinguished how Republicans and Democrats responded. Robideauxs noted that Republicans in the study were more likely to be swayed by Democratic messaging than Democrats were likely to be affected by Republican messaging.\(^ {15}\) One reason for such asymmetry would be if some Republican-leaning voters fall into the sort of voter pool that I am calling Red-Dog Democrats, people who lean against the national Democratic Party as currently positioned, but who feel no special identification with the GOP. The benefit of a study centered in Kentucky's 6th District, one that escapes some of the limitations of an experimental study by piggybacking onto a real-world contest, is that it's the sort of place rife with such voters.

My research uses a student sample similar to the one employed by Robideauxs, but like Kahn and Geer, I expose them to advertising using different types of crossover appeal, with the hope of distinguishing the relative

\(^ {11}\) Michael Franz and Travis N. Ridout, "Does Political Advertising Persuade?," *Political Behavior* 29, no. 4 (2007).


success of particular strategies. Building on previous research that casts doubt on the usefulness of negative advertising for this purpose, however, I will focus entirely on positive messages. Varying the messaging seems critical because most electorates are ideologically diverse, forcing candidates to appeal to more than one type of voter to win. The varying communication strategies that campaigns pursue show up in the types of advertising that candidates use. Some candidates tack to the center, either during a primary (playing up their electability) or in the general election. Some candidates play to the far extreme, hoping to rally their bases. The relative success of these opposing strategies depends, of course, on the nature of the voters in a given locale – and given the challenges faced by Democrats in red-state districts, my research will experiment with the latter messaging.

The approach they use for attracting crossover voters also can vary. Both liberals and conservatives typically give signals and code words that, because they are subtle, might excite the base without worrying other voters. Conservatives might make references to the military or guns, describe themselves in an upbeat way as “pro-life” or “pro-family,” and employ nationalist/patriotic themes — whereas liberals might underscore diversity/inclusion while praising corporations and emphasizing environmental/sustainability themes. Democrats who need to reach beyond the liberal base, therefore, might choose signals and imagery known to appeal to conservatives, while hewing close to the Democratic Party platform otherwise.

On the other hand, Democrats might try to inspire defection (i.e., voting for the candidate of the opposite party) using issue positions and policy preferences — which, according to one especially appropriate study, will reign supreme over candidate traits, voter information, or any other factor. Campaigns typically have more control over the issue positions they take than they will over imagery, which opponents also can help shape. They might adopt a position directly contrary to their own party’s inclinations, distancing themselves from the party brand, or they might send moderate signals on an issue that normally undercuts their party in the area. My research tries both sorts of approaches: issue-based appeals and symbolic appeals. I also use a sort of middle-ground approach: An issue-based appeal communicated indirectly through association with a political group, encouraging conservative participants to use that group affiliation as a heuristic while perhaps not offending left-leaning participants.

Like the political scientists dubious about how much campaigns matter, I am not optimistic that messaging can induce crossover voting. As Bartels wrote, voters make decisions in the ballot box based not on new information

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they learn from campaign communications, but what they already know about their own partisan identity. Unlike in a pure laboratory setting, in which participants express feelings about fake people, real Democratic candidate will not be able to mask their own partisan identity without alienating their own likely supporters. Democrats sounding conservative dog whistles in a primary contest will attract fewer “blue dogs” and “red dogs” (who are unaccustomed to answering the party’s call) than they will madden the “yellow dogs” who can switch to another candidate. The framing of my survey experiment will allow me to look beyond how conservatives and moderates respond, and observe liberals and Democrats as well, thereby replicating this real-world dilemma.

**Experimental Design**

I designed an experimental study that examines how voters’ attitudes about candidates are affected by different types of political advertising. Carrying forward the focus on Kentucky’s 6th District Congressional race, the experiment contains advertisements that featured each of the candidates competing in the Democratic primary at the time: Amy McGrath, Reggie Thomas, and Geoff Young. The sample, meanwhile, was drawn from students studying, and generally residing, within that district.

**Development and production of mock advertisements**

The advertisements used in the experimental design are not real. For purposes of control, I designed and created “mock” advertisements on behalf of each candidate that maximized realism to the fullest extent possible. I used iMovie for the video production after reaching different types of software, which offers templates for text, transitions, and music. I also downloaded video stock footage from Videoblocks, an online service that provides stock video, photo, and audio content for usage in projects such as this.

Each video, approximately one minute and thirty seconds long, begins and ends the same. It starts with a landscape B-roll of a Kentucky horse farm, with text overlay saying “Candidate Name for Congress.” The second frame is a photo of the candidate, with text in the lower left corner that says “Candidate Name, Democrat for Congress” on two lines, to make sure that (as in real life) the participant would know the candidate’s party. For consistency, I chose photos of each candidate in which they are smiling in front of a neutral, light-colored background. Each advertisement also features a standard track of background music chosen from iMovie’s library: “Pendulum.” The ending of each advertisement, meanwhile, includes B-roll footage of a waving American flag, followed by a shot of the U.S. Capitol Building with the text overlay “Candidate Name for Congress.”

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The differences come in the middle sections, toggling the advertisement characteristics and thereby creating my dependent variables. A voice-over also reads a brief script to reinforce the ad’s purpose. I allowed the candidates to communicate ideas to potential voters in three different ways: through policy promises, endorsements, or symbolism. (No ad attacks or even references opponents, which is not so extraordinary for a primary campaign.) A control ad speaks only of so-called “valence” matters – widely agreeable sentiments – with no issue appeal.

**The issue appeals**

I chose one sociocultural issue, one fiscal issue, and one “symbolic” issue to distinguish ads from the “valence” control ad. For a sociocultural issue, I chose guns and gun control because the topic is relevant in current debate, and issue positions can be strided easily along ideological lines. Candidates could oppose gun control or support a limited version of it: a ban on assault rifles. Choosing gun control addresses an issue relevant to the blue vs. red cultural gap, while avoiding matters most closely related to religious or moral identity. For the fiscal issue, the topic is government spending and taxes, with candidates either offering a “no new taxes” pledge or calling for “responsible” deficit reduction through modest taxes only on the rich. The symbolic appeal mimics McGrath’s own ad campaign by stressing patriotism and support for the military. The valence issue is education. Table 1 details all of these advertisement types.

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Table 1: Complete listing of mock advertisements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of advertisement</th>
<th>Synopsis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Sociocultural Position-based Moderate</td>
<td>“Common sense” gun control – ban on assault rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Sociocultural Position-based Conservative</td>
<td>Will vote no on any gun control legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Sociocultural Information-based Moderate</td>
<td>Endorsed by the Committee for Responsible Gun Ownership; national board member for three years; an organization promoting “common sense” gun reforms while protecting guns for hunting, sport, and self-defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sociocultural Information-based Conservative</td>
<td>Endorsed by the National Rifle Association; national board member for three years; an organization committed to protecting the 2nd Amendment and opposing gun control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Fiscal/economic Position-based Moderate</td>
<td>Promises to support “responsible” deficit reduction and an increase on taxes for the wealthiest Americans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Fiscal/economic Position-based Conservative</td>
<td>Will vote no on any legislation that would increase taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Fiscal/economic Information-based Moderate</td>
<td>Endorsed by No Labels; national board member for three years; is a bipartisan organization committed to combating the deficit through a combination of spending cuts and tax reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Fiscal/economic Information-based Conservative</td>
<td>Endorsed by the Committee for Small Government; national board member for three years; is an organization committed to smaller government and deficit reduction through spending cuts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Presence of symbolism</td>
<td>Contains strong patriotic symbolism and mentions support for the military; avoids “strong military,” or ideological clues, just support for the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Valence issue</td>
<td>Candidate generally supports education; ambiguous in terms of public, private, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The endorsement ads present an implied issue position. These ads contain an explanation about each organization’s purpose, using either real or fictitious organizations depending on what would sound conservative or middle of the road. The endorsement ads parallel the position-based ads, addressing gun control or taxes. In terms of structure, the endorsements are similar to the
policy promises: one conservative in nature, one moderate. Each ad first announces an endorsement by an organization, then states that the candidate has been a “national board member for three years,” ending with an explanation of the organization’s purpose. For gun control, the conservative ad uses the National Rifle Association (NRA), while the moderate ad uses the fictitious Committee for Responsible Gun Ownership, a group supposedly promoting “common sense” gun reforms while protecting guns for hunting, sport, and self-defense. The economically oriented ad uses tax policy, a salient issue that divides voters ideologically.\textsuperscript{19} The conservative ad features an endorsement by the Committee for Smaller Government, while the moderate ad refers to No Labels, a bipartisan organization committed to combatting the deficit through a combination of spending cuts and tax reforms.

The symbolism-based ad contains strong military imagery and themes of patriotism. No specific issue position appears. This ad type is designed to test how voters respond to communications that make no policy promises at all, reaching across partisan lines only through connotation. Finally, the public generally supports education, although they might differ in how to do so.\textsuperscript{20} Similar to the approach behind the symbolism ad, it avoids any specific policy positions, stressing that the candidate “supports education to bring forth a better future.” Technically, the valence ad is not a “control” because it is not completely neutral: It still seeks to elicit a positive response from participants.

\textbf{Participants}

My sample drew more than a hundred students from a large lecture-hall introductory college class taught in Lexington, Kentucky, within the 6\textsuperscript{th} Congressional District. Students discharged a class obligation if they participated, but they could select a different and equivalently easy assignment should they wish. The instructor receiving the participation data had no access to the survey responses, while I had no access to the participation data. Fifteen students were exposed to each ad type, five per candidate, which limits what I can say about possible interactive effects — whether the appeal works differently for a white man, a white woman, or an African-American man. Nonetheless, randomization across the candidate types should prevent the results from being contaminated by the specific demographic traits of any one individual.


PROCEDURE

The experiment was distributed to students Canvas (an online learning and classroom management software). However, I built the survey itself using Qualtrics, and posted the mock advertisements in a hidden YouTube location. Upon opening the survey, each respondent answered a basic test of political ideology to determine whether they were conservative, liberal, or moderate. Given the multidimensional nature of ideology, especially among young people still forming their political identities, respondents also receive variations of those base identifiers, gauging economic ideology, social ideology, and foreign-policy ideology. They simply asked: “On issues of ____ I identify as,” with response options for conservative, moderate, and liberal. The last question in this initial bank sought to ensure response validity: It started as a policy question but then instructed the respondent to give a particular answer. Respondents who failed to answer the test question correctly did not get to continue, and had to complete the other assignment in their course.

Next, respondents gave initial thermometer scores for the three Democrats, which would capture a mixture of what they already might have known about the candidates and how they reacted initially to the candidate’s looks and demographic traits. That is, respondents were asked to rate each candidate, with a low “temperature” being least supportive and a higher temperature conveying more warmth. After watching the advertisement, each respondent received the “thermometer reading” question again about the candidate featured in the ad. The difference between the initial score and the subsequent score represents an immediate response to the ad.

I used JMP statistical analysis software for data analysis. After tabulating the difference between the pre-test and the post-test, I then ran one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests on the means of the differences (y-variable) by each different type of advertisement (x-variable) to determine if the differences were statistically significant. In short, the p-values generated by this test informed me whether or not the respondents’ attitudes were changed by the advertisements enough that the shift likely did not occur by chance. The results could be filtered by respondent ideology and demographic information.

DATA AND ANALYSIS

Looking only at conservative respondents, the ads on average did make a difference (Table 2). Apparently, conservative voters will react differently to a Democratic candidate depending upon some combination of the candidate demographics and the ad message.
Table 2. ANOVA outputs, overall data, conservative respondents only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
<th>Prob &gt; F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exposure w/ candidate</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>277.56818</td>
<td>10.6757</td>
<td>2.0518</td>
<td>0.0205*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>202.91667</td>
<td>5.2030</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Total</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>480.48485</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expanding the category of “conservatives” to include self-professed moderates who nonetheless claimed conservatism in at least one issue area broadens the pool of potential voters for a Democratic nominee. Including baseline moderates who are conservative on a subset of issues seems critical for my research question given that Blue Dog Democrats likely fall into that category. It also nearly doubles the same size. We see that when these respondents are included, increasing the sample size, the p-value remains low, providing stronger evidence that my skepticism about the short-term power of advertising might be misplaced (Table 3). The Mean Square stays almost the same, so the predictive power of exposure remains about the same.

Table 3. ANOVA outputs, overall data, conservative respondents (including base moderate identifiers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
<th>Prob &gt; F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exposure w/ candidate</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>294.90339</td>
<td>10.1691</td>
<td>1.7383</td>
<td>0.0258*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>514.80000</td>
<td>5.8500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Total</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>809.70339</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Exploring Responses to Specific Types of Advertisements

The previous analysis separated respondents based on every variant of advertisement. My primary interest in varying the candidate’s demographic traits, however, was to prevent the results from being contaminated by use of a particular type of Democrat. Grouping the ads by message, without distinguishing the candidate used – which is to say, asking for results averaged across candidate demographics – only reduces any uncertainty whether respondents reacted differently depending upon the ad message.
Had I stopped here, I might have concluded that crossover appeals work well, at least in the short term, with conservatives. The results are not so optimistic. Table 5 sorts the ads according to how respondents differed from the central tendency. At the top of Table 5, with highest means, are the advertisement types that had the highest net positive effect on conservative respondents. Ads with negative means turned respondents off.

Table 4. Means of broad-based advertisement types, conservative respondents (including base moderate identifiers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Error</th>
<th>Lower 95%</th>
<th>Upper 95%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.8333</td>
<td>0.69014</td>
<td>1.465</td>
<td>4.2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.9091</td>
<td>0.72083</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>3.3379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valence</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.4286</td>
<td>0.63895</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>2.6951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.4167</td>
<td>0.69014</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>2.7846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolism</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.2308</td>
<td>0.66307</td>
<td>-0.084</td>
<td>2.3451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.1250</td>
<td>0.84525</td>
<td>-0.550</td>
<td>2.8004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.8000</td>
<td>0.75601</td>
<td>-0.699</td>
<td>2.2985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.0909</td>
<td>0.72083</td>
<td>-1.338</td>
<td>1.5197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-1.2143</td>
<td>0.63895</td>
<td>-2.481</td>
<td>0.0522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-1.2308</td>
<td>0.66307</td>
<td>-2.545</td>
<td>0.0835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Those results represent bad news for the power of crossover advertising, at least insofar as a campaign might hope tacking to the center could improve the impact of their ads. Most of the experimental ads performed no better among conservatives than the generic valence ad offering bromides about education. Figure 1 visualizes that pattern, showing the scatter plot of responses with diamonds establishing confidence intervals.

Every ad related to tax policy – whether conservative or moderate, explicit or indirect through an endorsement – left respondents colder toward the Democratic nominee than a pro-education puff piece. Conservative respondents responded more positively to only one sort of ad: The one announcing an endorsement from the National Committee for Responsible Gun Ownership (ad type 3 in Table 1). The next highest mean also results from a moderate gun advertisement, except position based – promising to protect the 2nd Amendment but pursue modest gun control, such as a ban on assault rifles. The more starkly pro-gun ads returned results that were more mixed, although it’s impossible to say whether that is because they doubted the credibility of a strong pro-gun ad from a Democrat or instead because they themselves have mixed feelings about gun control.

As a whole, almost every advertisement shifted candidate favorability upward (as shown by the positive means). The two “moderate” tax-policy ads are the exception: Indicating support for deficit reduction through higher taxes on the rich failed to win over young conservatives. The inclusion of
“economic” conservatives did not explain why the ad backfired, because when they are removed, the backlash remains in place (analysis not shown).

**Adding Candidates to the Mix**

For the previous section of analysis, I randomized over the type of candidate, so that ad impact would not be contaminated by the respondent pool’s specific reaction to messaging from a black or female politician (although, at the time, those were the two serious candidates in the race). However, I return to the question of candidate identity now, in case advertising interacts with race or gender.

Respondents did not react differently to the candidates at the outset, giving them statistically indistinguishable thermometer scores. Presumably, few of my respondents knew about the candidates in the 6th district, because the white male candidate (Geoff Young) is neither a serious contender and almost certainly would attract lower scores from politically aware district residents.

I begin by looking at post-advertising responses to the candidates overall, averaging across ad types and maximizing the sample size. I find that respondent reaction to the ads did interact with the candidate’s demographic traits. Based on the means, Amy McGrath received the highest net increase from conservative voters, at 1.13. Geoff Young followed at 0.7, and Reggie Thomas trailed at 0.55 (Table 7).

**Table 7: Means by candidate, conservative respondents (including base moderate identifiers)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Error</th>
<th>Lower 95%</th>
<th>Upper 95%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>McGrath</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1.13889</td>
<td>0.44037</td>
<td>0.2666</td>
<td>2.0112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.70455</td>
<td>0.39833</td>
<td>-0.0845</td>
<td>1.4936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.55263</td>
<td>0.42863</td>
<td>-0.2964</td>
<td>1.4017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Separating the treatment across both candidate and ad type cannot offer findings with any confidence, due to the limited sample size. At first glance, the means for each advertisement are displayed in Table 8. These means largely follow the same pattern as the previous analysis without candidates: sociocultural (guns) ads are at the top of the list, mostly regardless of candidate; fiscal/economic (taxes) ads trend toward the bottom. Specifically, the Guns/Information ads (i.e., the endorsement ads) perform well across all three candidates.
Table 8: Means by each advertisement type, conservative respondents only (including base moderate identifiers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advertisement Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Error</th>
<th>Lower 95%</th>
<th>Upper 95%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>McGrath/Guns/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5000</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>1.097</td>
<td>5.9033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath/Guns/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.0000</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>5.4033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young/Guns/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.0000</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>5.4033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas/Guns/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5000</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>4.9033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath/Symbolism</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.2500</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>4.6533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath/Valence</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.2500</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>4.6533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath/Taxes/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0000</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>-0.403</td>
<td>4.4033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath/Guns/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0000</td>
<td>1.7103</td>
<td>-1.399</td>
<td>5.3988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young/Guns/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0000</td>
<td>1.0817</td>
<td>-0.150</td>
<td>4.1496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young/Symbolism</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.8000</td>
<td>1.0817</td>
<td>-0.350</td>
<td>3.9496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas/Guns/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.7500</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>-0.653</td>
<td>4.1533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young/Guns/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.6000</td>
<td>1.0817</td>
<td>-0.550</td>
<td>3.7496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas/Taxes/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5000</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>-0.903</td>
<td>3.9033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas/Taxes/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5000</td>
<td>1.7103</td>
<td>-1.899</td>
<td>4.8988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young/Taxes/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5000</td>
<td>1.7103</td>
<td>-1.899</td>
<td>4.8988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas/Valence</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.1667</td>
<td>0.9874</td>
<td>-0.796</td>
<td>3.1290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young/Valence</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>-1.403</td>
<td>3.4033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young/Guns/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5000</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>-1.903</td>
<td>2.9033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas/Guns/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.2500</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>-2.153</td>
<td>2.6533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath/Taxes/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>1.7103</td>
<td>-3.399</td>
<td>3.3988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas/Taxes/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.3333</td>
<td>1.3964</td>
<td>-3.108</td>
<td>2.4418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath/Taxes/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.4000</td>
<td>1.0817</td>
<td>-2.550</td>
<td>1.7496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas/Symbolism</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.5000</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>-2.903</td>
<td>1.9033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas/Guns/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.7500</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>-3.153</td>
<td>1.6533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young/Taxes/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.7500</td>
<td>1.2093</td>
<td>-3.153</td>
<td>1.6533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young/Taxes/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-1.2000</td>
<td>1.0817</td>
<td>-3.350</td>
<td>0.9496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young/Taxes/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-1.3333</td>
<td>0.9874</td>
<td>-3.296</td>
<td>0.6290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath/Taxes/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-1.8000</td>
<td>1.0817</td>
<td>-3.950</td>
<td>0.3496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath/Guns/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-2.0000</td>
<td>1.7103</td>
<td>-5.399</td>
<td>1.3988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas/Taxes/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-2.3333</td>
<td>1.3964</td>
<td>-5.108</td>
<td>0.4418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do the ads seem to interact with candidate traits in any significant way? One pattern stands out. Messaging for McGrath and Young mattered; I cannot say it did for Thomas.

To begin with McGrath, the ANOVA analysis generated a p-value of 0.0378 (Table 9). McGrath generated especially positive responses when her ad reported an endorsement by a pro-gun group (review Table 8). Position taking,
with an attempt to entice prospective voting support, fell flat. Young’s ads also varied in the response they produced (Table 10), but in his case, taking an explicit pro-gun stance outperformed his valence ad (again, review Table 8).

Table 9: ANOVA outputs, McGrath responses, conservative respondents only (including base moderate identifiers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>McGrath ANOVA</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
<th>Prob &gt; F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exposure w/ candidate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>127.80556</td>
<td>14.2006</td>
<td>2.4211</td>
<td>0.0378*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>152.50000</td>
<td>5.8654</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Total</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>280.30556</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: ANOVA outputs, Young responses, conservative respondents only (including base moderate identifiers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Young ANOVA</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
<th>Prob &gt; F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exposure w/ candidate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>94.20238</td>
<td>10.4669</td>
<td>2.4643</td>
<td>0.0292*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>135.91667</td>
<td>4.2474</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Total</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>230.11905</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ads for Thomas produced a scattershot effect, compared to his valence ad, with the results not statistically distinguishable. That is because, in general, conservatives still rated him coldly after seeing an upbeat ad on his behalf (Table 11). When Thomas called for increased taxation on the rich, the response was overwhelmingly negative compared to when the white candidates suggested the same thing.

Table 11: ANOVA outputs, Thomas responses, conservative respondents only (including base moderate identifiers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thomas ANOVA</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
<th>Prob &gt; F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exposure w/ candidate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>67.47807</td>
<td>7.49756</td>
<td>0.9375</td>
<td>0.5092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>223.91667</td>
<td>7.99702</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Total</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>291.39474</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Angering the base?

Even so-called red states and even safe Republican districts contain more than just conservative voters. This experiment also included 82 survey respondents who identified as liberal. An expanded definition that includes “moderates” with at least one liberal issue area provides even more data: 130 observations. Liberals responded differently, depending on the messaging, as well – a result that, despite the small sample size, instills confidence given a p-value of 0.0018 (Table 12).

Table 12: ANOVA outputs, Broad-based advertisement types, liberal respondents (including base moderate)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All ANOVA</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
<th>Prob &gt; F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exposure w/o candidate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>161.88410</td>
<td>17.9871</td>
<td>3.1805</td>
<td>0.0018*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>678.64667</td>
<td>5.6554</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Total</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>840.53077</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Means of broad-based advertisement types, liberal respondents (including base moderate identifiers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Error</th>
<th>Lower 95%</th>
<th>Upper 95%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valence</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.7500</td>
<td>0.68650</td>
<td>1.391</td>
<td>4.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.1250</td>
<td>0.59453</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>2.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.9333</td>
<td>0.61402</td>
<td>-0.282</td>
<td>2.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.5455</td>
<td>0.71703</td>
<td>-0.874</td>
<td>1.965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.3846</td>
<td>0.65957</td>
<td>-0.921</td>
<td>1.691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.3571</td>
<td>0.63558</td>
<td>-0.901</td>
<td>1.616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.0625</td>
<td>0.59453</td>
<td>-1.115</td>
<td>1.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolism</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.84079</td>
<td>-1.665</td>
<td>1.665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-0.6250</td>
<td>0.84079</td>
<td>-2.290</td>
<td>1.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-1.6471</td>
<td>0.57678</td>
<td>-2.789</td>
<td>-0.505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whereas conservatives reacted in a relatively muddled way to the different crossover messages, usually warming to a candidate supportive of guns but turning away from a Democrat talking tax policy, liberal respondents showed no such confusion. Compared to the valence advertisement, every single crossover message dampened their enthusiasm for the Democrat (Table 13).

Still, the crossover messages usually resulted in net positive means. Positive but fluff advertising from a Democrat worked best with liberal voters – but most upbeat attempts to reach out to moderates and conservatives still either helped a little or at least did no harm. At worst, crossover ads hurt Democrats among liberals due to the opportunity costs they sacrifice by neglecting to send an attractive message to their base.

The one stark exception again appeared when we look at the social issue of gun control. As Figure 2 shows, taking a starkly pro-gun position eroded the response among liberals badly.

Figure 2: ANOVA scatter plot, broad-based advertisement types, all liberal respondents (including base moderate identifiers)
Candidate demographic traits operated in the opposite direction among liberal respondents. Liberals responded more favorably to ads from the African-American candidate, less enthusiastically to ads from white candidates, especially the white woman.

Table 14: Means by candidate, liberal respondents (including base moderate identifiers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Error</th>
<th>Lower 95%</th>
<th>Upper 95%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.638298</td>
<td>0.38407</td>
<td>-0.1212</td>
<td>1.3978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.468085</td>
<td>0.38407</td>
<td>-0.2914</td>
<td>1.2276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.244444</td>
<td>0.39251</td>
<td>-0.5318</td>
<td>1.0207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing Conservative and Liberal Responses

After examining the means and variance between conservative respondents and liberal respondents, we can how differently the two groups reacted to each sort of advertisement. Here are the ad responses, side by side:

Tables 15 & 16. Liberal and Conservative Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberal Respondents</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valence</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.7500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.9333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.5455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.3846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.3571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.0625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolism</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-0.6250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-1.6471</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conservative Respondents</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.8333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.9091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valence</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.4286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.4167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolism</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.2308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Information/Conservative</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns/Position/Conservative</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.0909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Information/Moderate</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-1.2143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Position/Moderate</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-1.2308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two gun ads performed notably better than the valence ad among conservatives. The valence ad, with no crossover message, performs best among liberals. One ad undermined candidates with both groups: the fiscally responsible "moderate" message on taxation, combining deficit reduction with
taxes targeting the rich. A “moderate” pro-gun position that still embraced a ban on assault rifles, meanwhile, fared well in both groups. Note that this moderate position on guns mirrors what we see in public opinion on gun control, while the lack of enthusiasm for fiscal discipline fits with the overall political message across political parties right now.

IMPLICATIONS

As stated previously, to win races, Democrats in states like Kentucky need conservative voters. One might think the obvious solution would be to run centrist Democratic candidates, but that solution presents multiple problems. First, the necessity of political fundraising pushes candidates to appeal to donors, which are oftentimes solidly on the right or the left.21 Second, conservative Democrats alienate their own base, losing staunch liberals to third-party candidates or driving down turnout. That leaves Democrats in red states in a sticky, if not impossible, situation most of the time.

This study provides some hope, however. Conservative voters do respond positively to some crossover messaging from Democratic candidates. The results may not undermine the existing literature casting doubt on the influence of campaigns.22 We do not know, for example, whether these short-term positive responses would persist. At a minimum, the candidate might need to be genuinely moderate or conservative, rather than just one willing to finesse a campaign message. But whether candidates matter or campaigns matter, something does seem to break through the ideological barrier.

Across the board, social issue-based advertising affected voters more powerfully than economic issues. While that lopsided response may be an outgrowth of my decision to use a student sample – most have not yet fully entered the workforce, and their place in the national economy has not solidified – I doubt it. It mirrors the polarization over cultural issues, and the moralization of what might have been more-technical issues at an earlier time. It also parallels the shift in Kentucky from being a swing state governed by Blue Dog Democrats, when economic issues played a greater role in national politics, to being a reliably Republican state now that social issues defined by competing identities dominate political discourse. Either way, this importance placed on social issues shows the most-direct route for appealing to the Blue Dog Democratic voters who still exist in large numbers across Kentucky and other Southern states – who tend to be fiscally moderate, if not liberal, while retaining their traditional values. Specifically, a moderately pro-gun ad played well across ideologies.

Candidate traits mattered less, aside from a few possible interactive effects from certain ads. Candidate race influenced responses, but in opposite directions depending on voter ideology, resulting in a wash. In terms of informing political campaigns how to communicate with conservative voters, the limited power of candidate identity is just as well: Candidate traits cannot be manipulated in the same way that communications can. Future research with a larger sample could explore whether crossover appeals vary significantly in their power depending on the candidate who tries to make them.
REFERENCES

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Resilient Communists:
How Fidel Castro Survived the Soviet Collapse and Cuba's Uncertain Road to
Democracy

Max J. Prowant
Morehead State University

It is easy to conclude that Fidel Castro was nothing more than a pawn of the Soviet
Union, and Cuba, a communist satellite throughout the Cold War. The island
received an annual subsidy of four billion dollars from the U.S.S.R. and hosted
Soviet troops; its economic dependence was so extensive that when the Soviet Union
collapsed more than 25 years ago, Cuba experienced a GDP contraction of between
30 and 40 percent. Despite this, Cuba's communist regime survived, even as many
formerly communist countries in Eastern Europe embraced new democratic
constitutions. This project seeks to explain how—in spite of the development of a
robust nationalism, and significant economic and political liberalization—Cuba's
ruling class managed to resist enacting significant democratizing reforms.
Elsewhere, these factors ushered in a "third wave" of democracy.

This paper takes up the question in the context of new opportunities for (and
pressures to) change. Raul Castro is set to step down from the presidency in 2018
amidst an ongoing economic crisis. Unfortunately, democratization remains
unlikely for three main reasons. The two notable political forces in Cuba at present
are the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) and the military or Revolutionary Armed
Forces (FAR)—neither of which advocates democratizing reforms. Cuba's dissident
community remains disorganized, and its civil society, woefully underdeveloped.
Finally, the economic liberalization policies enacted as a response to the Soviet
collapse have failed to foster the development of a strong and engaged middle class.

Key Words: Cuba, democracy, third wave

In his influential piece, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century, Samuel P. Huntington explains how, between 1971 and
1990, thirty countries made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy.
The wave encompassed the Soviet bloc of Eastern Europe, the dictatorships of
the Iberian Peninsula, the Philippines, South Korea, and the military regimes of

1 This paper, which was a co-recipient of the Abdul Rifai Award for best undergraduate
paper at the 2016 KPSA, was sponsored by Dr. Jonathan Piduzny.
much of Latin America. With the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, eager eyes turned to Cuba, awaiting the fall of Fidel Castro who, for three decades, had ruled with an iron fist. This paper examines the resilience of the Castro autocracy following the closing of the Cold War and current prospects for democratization on the island.

Huntington contends that countries democratize in “waves.” The third such wave was the happy consequence of five principle factors: the growing illegitimacy of authoritarian regimes; rapid economic development in the 1960s which led to an international rise in education and a global expansion of the middle class; doctrinal changes in the Catholic Church; external factors such as an emphasis upon Human Rights violations; and the “Snowballing” effect. (Huntington, 43). Of the thirty countries that transitioned, those that consolidated their democratic regimes continue to prosper economically through free trade and socially through free elections.

The small Communist island off the coast of Florida seemed destined to follow. Cuba suffered a GDP loss of 32% between 1991 and 1993 due to the loss of an annual 4.3 billion dollars in Soviet subsidies and aid (Gonzalez and McCarthy, 10). Despite an economic depression that would have proven the illegitimacy of most regimes, Castro was able to prevent Cuba from succumbing to the global pressures of democratization. The question remains: how? The Cuban people gained free education and free health care from the regime, but little more. Dissenters are severely punished, thousands of disenfranchised youth attempt to cross the Florida Strait in makeshift crafts each year, and malnourishment can be seen on any Havana street. At the height of the economic downturn, blackouts lasted as long as sixteen hours per day and rations were reduced to little more than bread (Sweig, 128). Under Castro’s leadership, the Communist paradise he promised never materialized and Cuba has limped along ever since.

There was, nonetheless, no major movement towards democracy or even to overthrow the regime. This paper argues that Castro’s ability to prevent what Cuban expatriates proudly predicted was rooted in an accommodation of seemingly minute factors. The stark nationalism engrained in the minds of the Cuban people since Castro’s ascent to power was a safety net from the initial fall of the Cuban economy. Measures of economic liberalization and the Communist party’s re-orientation towards the Catholic Church perpetuated the regime through the “Special Period” that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The regime’s actions also helped to prevent the establishment of a civil society, the absence of which is arguably the greatest contributing factor to the resilience of the Communist establishment (Mujal-Leon, 21).

While these measures, with no civic opposition to oppose them, were enough to perpetuate the regime, their effects are beginning to wane. At present, Raul Castro holds sway over the National Assembly, but even he, a relic of the revolution, cannot maintain his place for long. When the Castro era
comes to a close, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) are likely to struggle for control of the country (Muñal-León, 25). This paper argues that for democratic activists to have a stake, the economic liberalizations of the early 1990s must be executed more effectively and the dissidents must become organized in such a manner that offers a credible alternative to the Communist regime.

NATIONALISM AS A MEANS FOR SURVIVAL

Fidel Castro ascended to power via a guerrilla revolution in 1959. The bearded freedom fighter was introduced to the Cuban populace from his historic defense speech, "History Will Absolve Me!" At the time, Castro was a herald of hope for the masses who suffered from the inequalities of Fulgencio Batista’s dictatorial rule. To the people, he was the leader who "hates vanity of all kind." He was the man who stressed that “to be Cuban implies a duty; not to fulfill that duty is a crime, is treason,” (Castro, 1954). Throughout his reign, Castro never forgot to remind the audiences of his countless speeches that the revolution was an act of all Cubans standing together against capitalism and the exploitations that it incontrovertibly brought. Thus, the Communist regime’s obstacles were the people’s and every “New Man” Cuban was obliged to unite against them. As Julia E. Sweig contends, Castro’s revolution “was not imposed by outside forces, it was homegrown.” Furthermore, “its political and ideological roots were nationalistic, and deeply felt,” (Sweig, 130). Due to this deep-seeded Cuban pride, and share-the-load mentality, many Cubans remained loyal to their revolution throughout the “Special Period in a Time of Peace,” a period of austerity and hardship, brought about by the Soviet collapse.

The country entered the “Special Period” a mere three decades after the triumph of the revolution. Any euphoria or gratitude felt from the arrival of Castro was still felt, to a weaker degree, during this time of economic crisis. Children born during the thirty-year period were subject to the stories of a generation that had personally witnessed the “sultanism” of Batista (Dominguez, 114). It was these children who would have made up the contemporary dissidents during the economic crisis of the early 1990s. This generation, however, was raised in an era of respect for the Communist authorities and an age unknown to food shortage and other ills introduced during the “Special Period.” Only recently, with the maturing of a new generation, has popular discontent become more palpable. Thus, while the period was certainly a shock and a time for liberalization, the revolution’s ideology was strong enough to overcome popular discontent. The period was the first major test of Cuban Communist nationalism and the results were that the bulk of Cubans were complacent with the failed ideology, at least temporarily.
National pride was joined to the ideology by the decision to continue with Cuba's hosting of the 1991 Pan American Games. Though the country agreed to host the games in 1986, before the Cuban economy collapsed, it honored its decision to do so at high cost of the country's financial integrity. Using primarily materials produced domestically, the impoverished nation constructed costly athletic complexes and stadiums for tens of thousands of foreign observers. This was an opportune time for dissenters to express their discontent with the regime. What onlookers met, however, was massive crowds shouting "Fidel!" (Coltman, 273). Cuban athletes won one hundred and forty gold medals, more than any participating country including the United States. The ability to host such an elaborate Olympic-style event coupled with athletic success demonstrated to the populace that Cuban perseverance was enough to push through the bitterness of the times. It demonstrated to the international community (specifically the United States) that the Castro regime was capable of overcoming economic setbacks. From both views, Communism would remain.

PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY THROUGH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION

Nationalism, though a potent instrument in the immediate downfall of the Soviet collapse, would not be sufficient to protect the regime from what very much was a dire fiscal crisis. As Leycester Coltman explains, "In any country a fall of 5 per cent gross national product would be viewed as a major recession. The Cuban economy had declined more than 40 per cent..." (Coltman, 282). A regime is only durable if it is perceived to be legitimate and it effectively administrates the promises of its leaders (Lipset, 86). If the leadership is unsuccessful in doing so, its perceived right to govern begins to diminish. Cuba's ongoing economic depression revealed the ineffectiveness of the Communist regime. The administration needed to go beyond acknowledging the severity of the economic crisis and did so by making overt changes to policies.

The country commenced a series of capitalist practices in 1994, which required compromising its ideological aversion to free international trade. The country slowly navigated away from the economic quagmire of restricting trade to fellow socialist nations. Reluctantly, Castro opened Cuba to tourism. Much of the agriculture sector was privatized to Cuban farmers. Farmer's markets became legal as did the operation of micro-businesses such as paladares and casas particulares, small restaurants and bed and breakfasts respectively. During the reforms, the U.S. dollar was officially recognized as a legitimate form of currency, allowing for remittances from abroad to be spent outside of the now thriving black-market (Sweig, 132). Additionally, the country began to move away from dependence on agricultural production, particularly sugar. Cuba began trading with countries outside of Eastern Europe, notably through joint-
ventures with Canada and Spain. In an odd paradox, the fall of the communist bloc of Eastern Europe aided Cuba in this respect. Had the Soviets not fallen and the Cold War not ended, it would have been politically difficult (if not impossible) for the North Atlantic World to conduct business with Cuba, insofar as the United States in particular would have viewed it as aiding a Soviet satellite nation. Such economic measures proved to be beneficial as the country’s GDP steadily climbed beginning in 1995 by .4% and by 2.5% in 1996 (CIA World Fact Book, 1995, 1996). Furthermore, the privatized farms yielded greater productions than did the bureaucratically controlled farms which buoyed the economy but not the Communist regime’s ideology.

Liberalization was not confined to economic sectors during the Special Period. Recognizing the need to reinvigorate his legitimacy, Castro allowed for direct elections to the National Assembly. These elections were far from free as only members of the Communist party were eligible to appear on the ballots. Nonetheless, compared to the original method in which large crowds would chant their support of Castro and the revolution, this modern manner permitted Cubans to exercise a right granted to a growing number of peoples at the time. Even if the Cuban electoral process was illegitimate, the progressive nature of the move demonstrated that the regime was willing to enact small changes in order to manage reform and stave off calls for more radical democratization movements.

Additionally, the Communist party itself adapted. Much as Vladimir Putin is attempting to reinstate Eastern Orthodoxy throughout Russia, Castro began reviving the Catholic Church throughout the Special Period. Subject to the rule of a devout Marxist-Leninist, the Church was oppressed during the first thirty years of Castro’s reign. While it was never explicitly illegal to be a Catholic, or a practitioner of any religion for that matter, Catholics endured frequent harassment at the hands of Castro’s security forces. After the 1992 Constitution was ratified, which ensured religious tolerance, religious practice surged in Cuba (Sweig, 154). Furthermore, for the first time, openly religious individuals could be active members in the Communist party. This strategy of recognizing the Church was a ploy whose benefits continue to be reaped today. The more independent the Church, the greater its potential as political opposition; such was the case in Poland. The more integrated the Church is with the political apparatus, however, the more likely it is to inhibit democratization; such was the case in Argentina (Philpott, 43). This may have contributed to the regime’s survival in a time of severe economic hardship insofar as the push for religion allowed Cubans, specifically the disenfranchised youth, to direct their energies to faith-based institutions instead of against the regime (Gonzalez and McCarthy 37).

The measures taken by Castro certainly acted as an influential force in ensuring his regime’s survival. Whether because the regime efficiently coopted political opposition, or because Cubans failed to organize themselves, the
regime never faced high levels of civil strife. A well-organized civil society is oftentimes instrumental to forming a formidable opposition to a totalitarian regime. Much as Poland’s Solidarity movement is credited with the swift downfall of the Communist Party after 1989 roundtable talks, so Chile’s Concertación (Concert of Parties for Democracy) proved instrumental in organizing opposition to General Pinochet (Londregan, 241). Opposition allows for a diverse citizenry to unite and publically exploit the weaknesses and failures of an authoritarian state. The prolonged economic downturn in Cuba presented Cubans with an opportunity to overthrow the regime or, at least, demonstrate to Cubans who chose emigration rather than confrontation that frustration was ubiquitous. Alas, no such opposition existed.

Two further factors aid in explaining the lack of an organized opposition in Cuba. Formed directly after the revolution, the Comités de Defensa de la Revolución (CDR) proved effective as a collaboration of neighborhood watches. These community networks act as police forces and have unlimited resources when seeking out those who prove disloyal to the revolution. It is impossible to deduce exactly how many dissenters were silenced as a result of the CDRs, but their importance to the regime should not be underestimated. An additional factor is the lack of communication on the island. Vertically controlled, all information entering the country was, and continues to be, inspected and censored by the state. Thus, news of global democratization efforts reached Cuba slowly. The Cuban government dictates who may leave the island by approving travel visas. It was, furthermore, difficult for individuals to enter the island as the regime did not allow tourism until the early 1990s. Thus, international news of civic opposition groups toppling Communist regimes slowly reached Cubans.

**CASTRO’S CUBA AS A POST-TOTALITARIAN STATE**

The current regime is not what it was thirty years ago. Though there is a ruling autocracy, its guiding ideology has wasted away leaving an un-motivated and frustrated populace. The Cuban state has incontrovertibly evolved into what Juan Linz describes as a post-totalitarian state. Post-totalitarians, though still oppressive, have lost their vice-like grip they once held over their people. The mass mobilizations of the citizens have grown stagnant as citizens recognize, either through education or blatant failures of the totalitarian, the regime’s rhetoric. Furthermore, the totalitarian ideologies, once strong and vital, have faded into institutional memory. Most importantly, political plurality is greater in post-totalitarian states, effectively rendering the regime more susceptible to change (Linz, 43).

Requisites for totalitarianism were no longer met in Cuba. The *Hombre Nuevo*, or New Man, ideology which was relentlessly pursued by Ernesto “Che” Guevara, a military leader of the revolution, in the early years following the triumph of the revolution ultimately failed. The ideology stressed the
importance of the individual and the collective importance of every individual to the success of the revolution. Individuals, however, struggled to understand this when they worked extended hours and received only meager rations for bread. Even Marxist ideology, which extols egalitarianism, is becoming more and more overtly obsolete as the dollarization allowed for those receiving remittances from abroad to experience a far more cushioned experience than those whose relatives chose to remain on the island (Sweig, 132). Reliance on external support blatantly undermines the revolution’s claims of equality. Rather than create a strong middle class that is more similar to the egalitarian society desired by Castro, the economic measures were conducive to a socioeconomic divide. In addition to failed ideologies, the mobilization efforts are seldom and sporadic. The once fiery charisma of Fidel Castro has been extinguished by the reserved Raul, whose public appearances are flat compared to his elder brother’s. Mobilization efforts are further entrenched from an “alienated youth” who have been maturing in an ever-revolving economic slough (Gonzalez and McCarthy). Totalitarianism was further weakened through the eased restrictions of religion. The action was a blatant display of desperation on part of the Communist authorities. Some reports even indicate that the visit of Pope John Paull II in 1998 drew larger crowds than Fidel Castro ever could in Revolutionary Square. Lastly, the open display of dissidents has become far more common. Though the regime is still highly oppressive, demonstrated through the Cuban Spring of 2003 in which 73 dissident leaders were arrested, opposition is, nonetheless, extensive (Gershman and Gutierrez, 39). Thus totalitarianism has become stagnant if not obsolete in Cuba.

With Raul Castro set to relinquish his presidency in 2018, the times are conducive to an absolute military rule, bereft of communism. For nearly half a century, Fidel Castro was simultaneously the legitimate and unifying actor of both the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). Raul Castro has been able to retain the unity of the FAR and the PCC. A devout communist since his student years, he was the longtime Minister of Defense under Fidel and therefore continues his brother’s role as a qualified mediator between the two bodies. Despite the one-party system in Cuba, PCC, “is the weaker link in the political-military chain that rules Cuba.” The stronger has consolidated its place recently through the tourism industry. FAR currently controls sixty per cent of Cuba’s largest industry (Mujal-León, 25).

THE NEED OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR DEMOCRATIZATION

At an uncertain time in which power will likely be contested between two factions, democracy seems like a far-fetched hope. Lessons from the Third Wave suggest that two major factors, however, can help deliver its reality: foreign direct investment ventures and the unification of dissidents via the Catholic Church.
The economic state has failed to regain, or at least maintain, Soviet-style trade with Communist countries. In the early years of the new millennium, Cuba was beginning to benefit substantially from a trade venture struck with the late Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez. The agreement guaranteed the sale of heavily subsidized oil in exchange for Cuban doctors. The venture was a success; Cuba’s GDP grew slightly over twelve per cent in 2006. After the global recession of 2008, however, Venezuela could no longer uphold its end of the bargain. As a result, the growth rate of Cuba’s GDP dropped from an average of 9.3% between 2004 and 2006 to less than 2% in 2009. The country has continued to experience stagnant growth. Between 2012 and 2014, the average growth rate was a meager 2.3% (Villanueva, 22).

Cuba’s half-hearted commitment to capitalism has prevented the country from progressing. Though ideological concessions were made in response to the close of the Cold War, the private sector accounts for only twenty-five per cent of the total GDP. The reluctance is no doubt attributed to the Marxist tradition of the regime. Soon after Fidel’s revolution, he instituted agrarian reform and land expropriations (this continues to play a factor in U.S. foreign policy with Cuba). To place an emphasis on private ownership, no matter how many decades after the expropriations, would be an explicit demonstration of the failure of communism to both the exile community abroad and mainland Cubans. Thus, even under Raul, the private sector has not grown substantially. It is within the best interests of party hardliners, advocates of democracy, and anyone wishing to prevent an explicit military state to encourage the growth of the private sector.

Scholars have long argued that economic development can help prepare a country for democratizing reforms. Economic growth often leads to a middle class capable of contributing diversity and legitimacy to a potentially well-organized political opposition. As Seymour Lipset notes, “from Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently participate in politics,” (Lipset, 75). Policy makers ought to focus on maximizing the per capita income of Cubans rather than focus on income inequality. If per capita GDP is sufficient to render the average standard of living in Cuba to be comfortable, the masses will be able to focus more thoroughly on the nation’s politics and their role in them. It is, after all, difficult for democratic activists to organize universal support when the primary concern many Cubans face is a lack of food.

Cuban authorities could learn important lessons from the economic models of China and Vietnam. Both countries have leveraged foreign direct investment (FDI) to increase per capita incomes (Villanueva, 197). Cuba should embrace economic liberalizations fully and pursue FDI ventures. Though it is argued that FDI is a blatant exploitation of the working classes of foreign countries, its benefits are promising. In addition to spurring economic
growth, FDI allows for an entrance into the global market (Villanueva, 193). Cuba would be brought forth from the isolation Castro forced the country into. Furthermore, by incentivizing investors, the country would be subject to the sort of rapid modernization and industrialization seen in both China and Vietnam. In both countries, a middle class is slowly developing as a result of the reforms that they enacted decades ago. The ventures with Canada, Mexico and Spain that were stalled after the Venezuelan agreement should be revisited and prioritized now that Cuba is no longer receiving such extensive aid.

**The Role of the Catholic Church in Unifying Dissidents**

The apprehension towards an expanding economy many feel is justifiable if civic opposition does not mature. The dissident movement in Cuba has become progressively more noticeable. The Varela Project, which sought to produce a national referendum garnered 11,000 signatures before being presented and continues to be circulated (the current number of signatories is over 40,000). The petition, headed by Oswaldo Payá, intended to bring about democratic change through a provision in the Cuban constitution which permitted the proposal of legislation by individuals if they have the support of over 10,000 citizens. Naturally, the regime ignored the petition and arrested many of the leaders in the Spring of 2003. The massive lock-up of seventy-three dissidents became known as the “Black Spring.” The Varela Project was perhaps the most effective, organized act of opposition faced by the regime. It was also fourteen years ago. As Gershmam and Gutierrez argued, Cuban civil society, “is nowhere near as organized and effective as was Poland’s Solidarity movement during its underground phase in the mid-1980s.” (Gershmam and Gutierrez, 38-39). So unorganized and ineffective is the opposition that some have argued there are very few legitimate civil societies and an array of cluttered dissidents (Mujal-Leon, 30).

When Samuel Huntington notes that the third wave of democratization was “a Catholic wave,” he contends that Catholic leaders played important roles unifying dissidents (Huntington, 76). Since the closing of the Second Vatican Council, the Roman Catholic Church has taken a firm and global stance against authoritarianism and its oppression of basic human rights. The battle on behalf of human rights is largely what contributes to the harmonious relationship between the Church and democracy. This hasn’t always been the case. Before the “third wave,” it was long argued that Protestantism was a prerequisite of democracy and that Catholicism was an inhibitor of democratization. After Vatican II, the Church, “stressed the legitimacy and need for social change, [and] the importance of collegial action by bishops, priests, and laity.” (Huntington, 78). The church, however, is as susceptible to factions as any political institution. While some bishops became martyrs for their defiance of authority, such as Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador, many clerics chose a path of complacency with their respective authoritarian.
The most effective Churches were those which were autonomous of their regimes, whereas those which held positions within proved the most tolerant. While the Cuban Catholic Church certainly does not follow an Argentinian precedent of integration with the Castro regime, it was sufficiently coopted to the extent that there were no public demonstrations against the regime. With between sixty and seventy per cent of its population being recognized as Catholic, Cuba contains a unifier of its dissidents: The Catholic Church.

The chief religious leader in Cuba is Jaime Cardinal Ortega. While the Cardinal is a clear supporter of dissidents and a voice for political prisoners through his negotiations with Castro which led to the release of fifty-two political prisoners in 2010, to this point he has not exhibited the charisma that enabled Catholic leaders to foster democratization in the third wave countries. The reluctance of action is best explained through the belief that a gradual confrontation of the regime is more likely to bring about lasting change. While gradualism is widely accepted as a practice that fosters consolidated change more successfully than does revolutionary action, it is the action of civil society which aligns the various sects of a citizenry to demonstrate popular disapproval. This demonstration often causes the tension that allows for a peaceful transition as was performed in Poland. It is feared that political action may provoke the regime to retract its ambivalent approach to the Church. This apprehension is folly. The Church will not perish as a result of communist repression, as was demonstrated through the resurgence of the Church in the 1990s and its continued growth today.

Cardinal Ortega delivered his intent for retirement to Pope Benedict XVI in 2008, but has yet to be relieved under Pope Francis. Whoever the Pope appoints to fill the position should take advantage of the large community his successor nurtured. The Church has not only grown, it has been viewed as a network of charity throughout the island, known for supplying food to the impoverished Cubans. With the charitable reputation inland, independence of the regime and an international network of support, the Cuban Catholic Church is poised to ignite a robust opposition to a faltering government. The new Cardinal should unify the leading bishops and publically condemn the continued human rights abuses, and lack of freedom of expression, speech, and assembly. The institution has the potential to organize the million-man marches seen in the Philippines, and cultivate a civil society as was seen in Brazil and Poland. To do so, Church leaders must recognize their independence of the regime and the Church’s capability to endure.

CONCLUSION
The time for change in Cuba is looming ever closer. When Raul Castro leaves the office of president, the Revolutionary Armed Forces will consolidate their control and it is impossible to predict the level of oppression that their regime will bring about. Popular discontent is not absent in Cuba, organization among
the dissenters is. Democratic activists outside of the regime must make it their initiative to unite the abundance of dissidents as moderates within the regime must use what little voice they have to direct attention to ventures that will cultivate a middle class. With a unified civic opposition and a robust middle-class, there can be little more to hinder Cuba from joining the ranks of the countries of the Third Wave.
REFERENCES


The Paradox of the Progressive Presidency: How the Democratization of the Presidential Selection System has Degraded the Office¹

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Every U.S. president leaves a lasting mark on the institution, few more significantly than the small number who have impacted the way presidents are selected. This paper examines how the presidential selection system has evolved over time and the negative effects this evolution has produced. The Framers created a complicated selection process hoping the Electoral College would attract and elevate “men of first character.” Although the system failed to operate as its architects intended as a result of the early and inevitable development of political parties, Martin Van Buren helped to adapt the selection system to the new environment in a way that preserved many of the intended benefits. Progressive reformers—who believed the process to be insufficiently representative, and too easily dominated by party elites and special interests—worked to democratize the selection process over the course of the twentieth century. Their reforms weakened the role of party elites and led to the open primary and caucus system Americans know today. This paper argues that in so doing, progressive reformers inadvertently opened the presidency to unqualified individuals, incentivizing partisan rhetoric and increasing partisan divisions in the process.

Key Words: Presidency; progressivism; Martin Van Buren, primary

A glance at the current presidential field is more disheartening than ever this year. The candidates are predominately unqualified and inexperienced, apparently interested in the presidency for reasons of personal ambition. As a result, the campaign, still in its early stages, has been particularly nasty: full of low intrigue, demagogic appeals to Americans’ fears, and language designed to set class against class. This is an urgent problem, revealed for the world to see by the primary and caucus elections currently underway. This paper argues that this problem can be traced to progressive reforms of the presidential selection system.

When the founders of the United States created the presidency, they designed a selection system that was supposed elevate men who had a long

¹ This paper, which was a co-recipient of the Abdul Rifai Award for best undergraduate paper at the 2016 KPSA, was sponsored by Dr. Jonathan Pidluzny.
record of public service, while discouraging the ambitions of power-hungry demagogues. The system never worked quite as it was intended to. When Martin Van Buren reformed it in the early decades of the republic, he incorporated an important role for political parties, in part to discourage office seekers from whipping up public opinion. Later progressive reformers took a much different approach because they believed that the federal government had become inactive, no longer reflective of the changing will of the nation. In their efforts to make the president more energetic and powerful by tethering it more closely to public opinion, the progressives inadvertently dismantled the barricades that discouraged unqualified individuals from attaining the highest office in the land.

Today we are living with the consequences of the progressives’ actions more than ever. Popular leadership and demagoguery have become requirements to run for president. In fact, the current presidential selection system is less a test of true leadership and capability and more a test of how well a candidate can incite emotion in the electorate to obtain this high office. If we wish to elect the President of the United States that our nation requires, we must do away with progressive reforms to the selection process.

**The Framers and Van Buren: Creators and Savior of the Responsible Selection System**

The framers of the United States Constitution, having just fought a bloody war of independence to dissolve the bonds that bound them to Britain, could not help but have King George in mind when writing the United States Constitution. They intended to create an executive office strong enough to empower an effective and energetic leader, but not so strong as to threaten American liberties. Drawing from their knowledge of history, the framers created a president very different from the one we imagine today. The president was not created to be a policy-maker in chief, but rather, to serve as the country’s chief executive and Commander in Chief, implementing the will of Congress while also serving as a check on its power.

The framers feared that Congress, particularly the House of Representatives, would be susceptible to the continually shifting will of the American people. They hoped the president would be a statesmen sufficiently independent and sufficiently enlightened to act as a restraint upon the passions of the people. As Alexander Hamilton summarizes in Federalist 71, it is the responsibility of the president to “withstand the temporary delusions [of the people] in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection”. In order for the president to function with this level of independence, it was vital that he have distance from the people. In the original

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design of the Electoral College state legislatures nominated presidential electors and trusted them to vote for the president according to their judgement. This method of selection was not only designed to create executive independence but also to elevate the most capable person in the nation. To the founders, this meant someone with a national reputation of service to his country. They understood that enlightened statesmen would not always be at the helm, but nonetheless hoped to ensure presidents would be “noble patriots” and “lovers of the common good”.

In his seminal work, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development*, James Ceaser contends that the presidential selection system has five goals: to minimize the harmful effects of ambitious politicians, to promote a respectable kind of executive leadership, to secure a capable executive, to ensure a legitimate succession, and to provide for the proper level of change within the country. The ideal selection system would then deter and discourage narrow ambition and self-interested politicians, attract and elevate men of first character capable of discerning the true interests of their country, yield a clear result that confers popular legitimacy upon the victorious candidate, and discourage radical and dangerous change while permitting adaptation to circumstances.

Ceaser’s conception of the purpose of a selection system provides an effective and unbiased way to assess a system. For example, the founders’ system sought an institutional solution to overly ambitious politicians in the hopes of promoting a cool and sedate statesman to hold the highest office in the land. This form of executive would also promote a slow gradual change that the founders thought was superior to constant change deriving from the popular will. The framers of the United States constitution were particularly concerned with creating a system that would discourage demagoguery, emotional appeals to the hopes and fears of the voters designed to further private ambition or the goals of radical factions, even at the cost of the public good.

It became apparent early in the republic’s history that the founders’ selection system was not viable. The unforeseen development of partisan politics greatly complicated the Electoral College process. The presidential electors were expected to use their independent judgement to select the president, placing ability above factional affinities. Though the founders

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expected leaders like Washington to be rare, they hoped that the Electoral College could find a candidate whose record of long public leadership would create a consensus both in the college and the nation at large.7 These ideal election results rarely came about. Principally because, the electors themselves were chosen by state legislatures based on their political party. What was more the Electoral College often failed to reach a majority decision, which required the House of Representatives to select the president.

After the Jeffersonian revolution of 1800, the Federalist Party quickly imploded. This left the Democratic-Republican Party as the dominant force in American politics, beginning a period of non-partisanship in American history dubbed the “Era of Good Feelings”.8 Ironically, the decline of partisanship did nothing to repair the crumbling presidential selection system. The nation still had trouble producing consensus figures of national prominence, which lead presidential hopefuls to build their national reputations by running on divisive single-issue campaigns. They incited emotions among the electorate, rather than carefully crafting policy and deliberation. This allowed demagogues, rather than public spirited civic servants in Congress and the White House, to set the agenda of the country’s national debates9.

Demagogic campaigns rarely yielded a true national majority, which frequently threw the election to the House of Representatives. Allowing the House to decide often raised legitimacy questions as the president they chose was usually selected due to backroom political negotiations reminiscent of a Renaissance-style College of Cardinals. A prime example of this was the election of 1824, in which not one of the four candidates managed to win a majority in the Electoral College. The House ultimately elected John Quincy Adams president, even though Andrew Jackson had won the most popular votes. As such, the election lacked legitimacy not only because the less popular candidate had won, but also because it was rumored that the Speaker of the House, Henry Clay, had swung his support behind Adams for a cabinet seat.10

When Martin Van Buren became a United States Senator, he was horrified by the election process that the non-partisan Era of Good Feelings had brought about. His remedy was to re-invent the American party system and create a more organized selection process for the president.11 He knew the party system would not completely eradicate popular leadership appeals like

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7 Madison, James, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and Isaac Kramnick. *The Federalist Papers*
those that arose during the Era of Good Feelings, but he hoped to constrain them to manageable levels. Under the system he devised, the parties convened a meeting of their senior members to select a presidential nominee. In practice this ensured that an individual who had long commanded the respect of the party leadership and who could unite the varying factions found within each party, received the nomination while minimizing divisive public debates. This system allowed the American voters to pick which of the two candidates they wished to be the chief executive, but ensured that both candidates were qualified public servants rather than firebrands who obtained power through popular appeals. This new system, sought to realize the founders’ vision after the old system proved impracticable. Van Buren’s conception of executive leadership would promote a politician who could unify their party, which is to say, the best form of executive leadership to Van Buren was a power broker who could strike compromise among the different political factions.

THE PROGRESSIVES AND THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN SELECTION
SYSTEM

The party-dominated system created by Martin Van Buren lasted for nearly a century, but it began to face opposition at the turn of the 19th century. The progressives disagreed with the principles behind the party-dominated system and sought to reform it. Woodrow Wilson, a leading progressive thinker and two term president, was one of the Van Buren system’s many critics. Wilson believed that society was constantly advancing for the better and concluded that government should be “Darwinian in Structure and Practice”12. Despite this, Wilson did not trust the people entirely and sought to set up a system that would enable political leaders to guide public opinions, and therefore, the trajectory of the nation.13 Progressives rejected the status quo orientation of Van Buren, and the founders, who contended that change must be stunted to allow for calm, cool, and sedate reflection. In contrast, Wilson believed that government should drive change so as to promote society’s continuous progress.

Because of his reservations about Congress, which he believed had been corrupted by special interest, Wilson thought the president was the best hope to serve as leader of the masses. In his book Constitutional Government in the United States, he argues that the president is uniquely placed as the only nationally elected figure to serve as the direct link between the federal government and the citizens. He saw reliance upon public opinion as an

advantage that would allow him and future presidents to overcome Congress. He states that “The President is at liberty, both in law, and conscience, to be as big a man as he can. His capacity will set the limit; and if Congress be overborne by him ... [it is only because] the President has the nation behind him, and Congress has not. He has no means of compelling Congress expect through public opinion".\(^{15}\)

While the founders’ saw popular leadership as an opportunity for demagoguery, Wilson only saw it as an opportunity for presidential greatness. In Wilson’s view the party served to weaken the president, subordinating his influence to amoral party bosses for his continued election. To free the president from the chains of bondage that parties placed upon him, Wilson advocated for a national primary. The primary, Wilson believed, would make the president the true head of the party by leveraging public opinion. The candidate would create the ideas that the party was centered around and, through his role as chief executive, implement them. In short, Wilson believed the parties should serve as an institution whose primary purpose was to provide a basis of leadership to the president. Today, both parties hold conventions to select their nominee for the general presidential election. The vast majority of party delegates are selected in popular state primary and caucus elections that take place in the year leading up to the general election. The primary selection system we know today dates to the 1970’s. Prior to this a mixed system prevailed, in which roughly half of the delegates to the nominating convention were selected by party bosses, while the other half of the delegates were pledged to a particular candidate. The mixed system was gently phased out due to a desire to strengthen the party and its candidates mandate by democratizing the selection process. For the framers the presidential selection process, was designed above all to elevate public spirited and wise representatives who would refine and enlarge the public view. The modern primary understands representation differently and endeavors to translate the public view into policy, even without refinement.

**A Critique of the Modern Selection System**

An in-depth look at our current selection system would lead one to believe that the progressive reforms have impacted our country for the worse. Wilson’s attempts to free the president from the corrupt clutches of the party bosses was admirable, but he has replaced this form of corruption with something equally pernicious. The open primary has unleashed personal ambition, fostered promises of radical change, and brought the presidency within reach of unqualified aspirants. An examination of the current system using the five purposes of presidential selection set forth by Ceaser guides one to the discovery that the current system meets few of the criteria in an adequate

manner. In some cases, the modern election system meets the criteria so poorly that it is alarming.

The current system's greatest deficiency is its inability to properly restrain ambitious individuals with little regard for the good of the nation and the lengths they may go to in order to acquire power. Most other major problems in our selection system derive from this deficiency. By extinguishing all checks on popular leadership, Wilson opened the door to the potential damages of rampant ambition. All popular leadership is not bad; if used correctly it can educate the people and bring about a well thought out policy by guiding the popular opinion. As Wilson said

   Whoever would effect a change in a modern constitutional government must first educate his fellow-citizens to want some change. That done he must persuade them to want the particular change he wants. He must first make public opinion willing to listen and then see to it that it listens to the right things.16

This is how Wilson thought most candidates would behave. However, Wilson like most progressives thought too optimistically of human nature. The century of political campaigns since has demonstrated that it is generally easier to whip public opinion into a frenzy then it is to guide public opinion.

Donald Trump is the candidate most often accused of being an ambitious demagogue in the current election cycle. This accusation comes from fellow Republicans like Senator Lindsey Graham who said "He's just trying to get his numbers up and get the biggest reaction he can"17 as well as political commenters like Megan Garber of The Atlantic, who said no figure deserved to be called a demagogue more "since Huey Long and Joe McCarthy".18 It is unfair to say he is the only demagogue in the current election cycle, as our entire election system demands that candidates abuse the art of popular leadership in order to drive supporters to the polls.

One of the reasons Trump resorts to inflammatory popular appeals is that he has never held office and therefore has no record to run on. Trump often uses language that can only be described as fear mongering. He uses his speech to slam the President and appeal to the fears, whether justified or not, many

American feel about foreigners. When speaking of the border situation, Trump was hardly statesmen-like when he said

It is so terrible. It is so unfair. It is so incompetent. And we don't have the best coming in. We have people that are criminals, we have people that are crooks. You can certainly have terrorists. You can certainly have Islamic terrorists. You can have anything coming across the border. We don't do anything about it. So I would say that if I run and if I win, I would certainly start by building a very, very powerful border.

A great deal of his rhetoric also expresses his anger and dissatisfaction with the progressive policies of President Barack Obama. He rouses those members of the population who are unhappy with the changing times and believe that these changes are destroying the core value of America. In the same speech about immigrants, he also says of President Obama,

Our country is really headed in the wrong direction with a president who is doing an absolutely terrible job. The world is collapsing around us, and many of the problems we've caused. Our president is either grossly incompetent, a word that more and more people are using, and I think I was the first to use it, or he has a completely different agenda than you want to know about, which could be possible. 19

Trump's quote about President Obama is an example of demagoguery at its worst. He is clearly playing to the fears that many conservatives hold regarding the Obama presidency. He even goes so far as to imply that Obama does not have the best interest of the country at heart.

The Republican candidates are not alone in their demagoguery. Bernie Sanders uses a form of demagoguery that Wilson himself found most despicable of the three classical varieties 20. He pits the lower and middle classes against the wealthy. Sanders speeches portray America as a country seized by oligarchic forces, in which the wealthy have made it nearly impossible for anyone to climb the social ladder. Sanders views are summated in a speech he gave at Georgetown University

The rich get much richer. Almost everyone else gets poorer. Super PACs funded by billionaires buy elections. Ordinary people don't vote. We have an economic and political crisis in this country and the same old, same old establishment politics and economics will not effectively address it. 21

21 *Senator Bernie Sanders on Democratic Socialism in the United States - Bernie
His campaign is built on flamboyant denunciations of titans of finance and grandiose promises to take America back. Sanders’ rhetoric appeals to voters because it speaks to real economic anxieties: economic inequality is reaching Gilded Age levels at a time economic opportunity appears to be contracting.

The problem is that Sanders’ popularity is rooted in the visceral appeal of his rhetoric as opposed to sensible and measured policy proposals. The costs of Sanders policy proposals would be astronomical, a point not even Sanders denies this. He justifies such spending by making the wealthy take the brunt of the taxes that would be required to pay for his socialistic programs. Despite his insistence that his progressive taxes could pay for his policies, a truly policy examination proves that they could not. A prime example is his method of paying for his free college education for every American. His proposed method of payment is a tax on every trade that takes place on Wall Street. This tax serves the dual purpose of not only paying for free college but also discouraging what he considers financial gambling. The only problem is that his policy would no doubt discourage trades on Wall Street, and in so doing raise significantly less revenue.

Just as demagoguery can help some candidates soar, those who are less adapt in its usage will flounder and die in the political arena. The two best examples of this in recent memory are Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush. In the 2008 democratic primary Hillary Clinton lost to the young, inexperienced, Senator Obama. Obama achieved fame by appealing to Americans desire to overcome partisanship and create a land of prosperity centered on liberal values. In other words, Obama played to the average American desire for a better tomorrow. As Caesar points out, promises of prosperity divorced from sound policy proposals are also a hallmark of a demagogue. Clinton ran on her experience and made no such appeals. In fact, she was honest about the need for a personal health insurance mandate on the campaign trail, while candidate Obama criticized her mercilessly he was forced to admit the truth of her statements once he took office. Jeb Bush, who recently withdrew from the Republican race, has been greatly harmed by his inability to appeal to the people’s emotions. At the beginning of the election cycle, Jeb Bush was the


23 "How Bernie Pays for His Proposals - Bernie Sanders." Bernie Sanders RSS.


front runner but he was rather quickly overtaken by his more demagogic opponents. His emphasis on capability has proven to hold less weight with the American people than the broad and emotional generalizations of numerous competitors.

The greatest argument in favor of democratizing the selection process was that the open primary selection system was truly democratic and therefore more legitimate. Despite the modern assertion that direct popular elections are more democratic, the current system undermines the perception of democratic legitimacy in several ways. The current primary system has made our presidential races similar to the non-partisan ones of the era of good feelings that were such a failure. Without a strong party to restrain the candidate, they build their own reputation through demagoguery which is in essence a way to deceive the American people. The primary system has also extended the presidential election cycle. Now candidates announce a full two years before the election. This long cycle diverts the American people from other smaller elections in their state that are important as well as taking clout from the current president who no longer sets the national debate. The role of money and big business in campaigning, made necessary by the primary process, undermines perceived legitimacy giving the appearance that elections can be bought. This problem has been raised by several progressives including Woodrow Wilson.26

The modern selection system does tragically little to encourage cool and sedate reflection in American politics, but rather accelerates seesaw like policy change in accordance with the will of the people. Despite being the modern conception of democracy, this continuous change is one of the major problems with our nation. Pure and undiluted democracies have historically been unstable. Athens, the cradle of democracy, was destroyed because its government, was too responsive to the self-interested and changing will of the people. 27 In Federalist 10, James Madison says that “Democracies have been ever spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the right of property, and have in general been as short in lives as they have been violent in their deaths”.28 The framers preferred the term “republic”. A republic is rule by the representatives of the people, the idea being that the representatives can gauge public opinion and restrain it when it becomes radical. In Federalist 71, Alexander Hamilton argues that it is the duty of government officials, particularly the president, to withstand the popular delusions and do what is best for the country.

26 Caesar, James W. Presidential Selection: Theory and Development, 320-342
To conclude, the current presidential selection system is a serious threat to American republicanism. We are a proud and noble republic, founded to encourage government by reason and reflection. Our current selection system relies on neither and instead works against both. In order to promote the selection of presidents of first character we must scale back the democratic reforms of the progressives. People often complain that the quality in presidential candidates is deteriorating. One cannot help but agree with this opinion, but the only way we can improve is by changing the way we choose our president.
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